The Effects of Board Characteristics and Ownership Structures on Compliance with Mandatory IAS/IFRS Disclosure Requirements: Evidence from Qatar by JALLAD, YARA B.
 QATAR UNIVERSITY  
   COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 
THE EFFECTS OF BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES 
ON COMPLIANCE WITH MANDATORY IAS/IFRS DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: 
EVIDENCE FROM QATAR 
BY 
 YARA B. JALLAD 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to  
the College of Business and Economics 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of    
Master of Accounting   
 
 January   2020 
 
 
 
2020 Yara B. Jallad. All Rights Reserved. 
  
ii 
 
COMMITTEE PAGE 
 
The members of the Committee approve the Thesis of  
Yara B. Jallad defended on [Defense Date]. 
 
 
 
Name 
 Thesis/Dissertation Supervisor 
 
 
  
Name 
 Committee Member 
 
 
 
Name  
Committee Member 
 
 
 
Name 
Committee Member 
 
 
 
 
 
Add Member 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved: 
 
Professor Dr. Adam Mohamed Fadlalla, Dean, College of Business and Economics  
  
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
JALLAD, YARA, B., Masters : January : [2020], Master of Accounting 
Title: The Effects of Board Characteristics and Ownership Structures on Compliance 
with Mandatory IAS/IFRS Disclosure Requirements: Evidence from Qatar 
Supervisor of Thesis: Dr. Emad A. Awadallah  
Compliance with internationally accepted and renowned accounting disclosure 
requirements has presented itself with having utmost importance in times of increased 
calls for transparency. This study aims to examine the effect of selected corporate 
governance factors on the extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements in listed non-financial entities in Qatar. Contrary to most extant studies, 
this thesis aims to study corporate governance factors in the light of board 
characteristics and ownership structures as determinants of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures as opposed to the commonly examined factors of firm characteristics. The 
sample consists of 72 annual reports belonging to 24 listed non-financial firms on the 
Qatar Stock Exchange over the years of 2015, 2016 and 2017. A self-constructed 
disclosure index consisting of 216 IAS/IFRS disclosure items was prepared to 
investigate the degree of compliance by the chosen listed non-financial entities. The 
degree of compliance was reached by exercising two different scoring methods, the 
dichotomous approach and the partial compliance approach, resulting in two different 
compliance scores of 86% and 78%, respectively. Six board characteristic variables and 
three ownership structure variables were chosen for this study. These were gender 
diversity, board size, CEO duality, presence of founding family members on the board, 
proportion of non-executive directors, cross directorships, institutional ownership, 
government ownership, and foreign ownership. After conducting multiple regression 
analyses with both compliance scores, the results documented are mixed. Gender 
diversity is found to be significantly negatively correlated with the extent of compliance 
with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements under both scoring methods. 
Proportion of non-executive directors and foreign ownership were found to have a 
significant negative association with the level of compliance with disclosures under the 
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dichotomous approach. In the light of the partial compliance approach, CEO duality, 
family members and non-executive directors on board were found to be significantly 
positively correlated to the levels of compliance. Lastly, this study contributes to the 
corporate governance and disclosure compliance literature in Qatar. It further aids 
regulators, stakeholders, enforcement bodies and entities in realizing the possible 
benefits or drawbacks of certain corporate governance mechanisms on compliance with 
disclosure requirements.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Study   
An echo of financial crises, high-profile company collapses and the global 
consequences witnessed in the onset of the 21st century led to a hefty focus on the 
concept of financial disclosure transparency and the need for corporate governance. 
These incipient financial scandals continue to emphasize issues pertaining to corporate 
governance with chief attention allocated on board structures, control and 
accountability, as well as disclosures and transparency (Mallin, 2018). The 
globalization and interconnectivity of the economic world has also reached its peak 
which inevitably results in foreign investments and crises to be felt on a global scale. 
As a result of the aforementioned, entities concerned with the performance of and 
whom are invested in companies conveyed their relentless calls for a unified global 
form of financial information disclosure practices supported by the best practices of 
appropriate corporate governance founded on the formation of a sound board of 
directors and ownership structure. Hence, the International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were issued to serve as a guide 
for proper disclosures while corporate governance codes were continuously evolved, 
reformed, and their mechanisms monitored. This inevitably led to the topics of 
IAS/IFRS disclosure compliance and corporate governance to become the two utmost 
important topics of the century.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The fall of Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen, Merrill Lynch and others 
highlighted the dubious managerial attitudes, lax policies, and poor financial 
disclosures which could be traced back to the core problem: weak corporate governance 
fueled by agency problems. The separation of ownership and control followed the birth 
of the corporate forms of business (Berle & Means, 1932). This contributed to the 
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unalignment of manager and investor interests; illustrated further by the agency theory 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Therefore, as a result of many fraudulent events and 
scandals, reporting of financials and disclosures grew to become amid the basics of a 
strong corporate governance system (ElGammal, El-Kassar & Messarra, 2018).  
A well-designed structure of corporate governance can enhance disclosure 
practices, warrant the focus of management on increasing firm value, and lessen the 
possibility of agency costs rising between managers and investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Therefore, the contributing factors to the pipeline of scandals were eminently 
the extreme corporate misconducts where vital financial information and disclosures 
were not disseminated to their rightful shareholders; lowering their chances in making 
informative decisions.  In due course, sound corporate governance structures are 
founded on the pillars of ethical boards, unbiased management, and sound ownership 
structures.  
Ultimately, the board of directors has a vital role in corporate governance 
frameworks where the role it plays in the oversight and the experiences passed on to 
management aids in the capitalization of opportunities and in delivering reliable and 
timely financial information to investors (Quigley, 2009). Similarly, ownership 
structures also dictate the levels of foreign, government, or block holder control and the 
influence they exert on the extent of compliance with disclosure standards that may 
result from it.  Should these vital pillars be given a leeway in the form of implementing 
and following their own standards, financial reports and disclosures made will not be 
in harmony or of any benefit to the international business arena; leading to crucial 
consequences.  
The prominent diversity in accounting systems leads to noteworthy economic 
consequences regarding the interpretation of financial reporting internationally (Choi 
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& Levich, 1991; Bushman & Smith, 2001). Previous empirical and theoretical studies 
indicate that vested accounting standards like IFRS could be an encouragement for 
developing countries to increase financial reporting disclosure quality within their listed 
companies (Othman & Kossentini, 2015). The State of Qatar is of no exception in this 
case.  
Qatar has rapidly developed and attracted many investments in the region by 
foreign investors (Mardini, 2013). However, the accounting profession and system in 
Qatar is considered to be in primeval stages as opposed to other neighboring countries 
(Al-Maliki, Hammami, & Mardini, 2015). Therefore, it could be derived that there is 
an eminent gap between the level of economic development and accounting system 
development (Al-Khater & Nasser, 2003). However, Qatar has adopted International 
Accounting Standards (IAS’s) since 1999 and has been in line with the recognition of 
a single set of accounting principles approved internationally and the adoption of the 
IFRS.  
Over the past decade, the country has ushered itself as one of the most prominent 
foreign investment players in the global business arena and has continuously up-surged 
efforts to attract investments into the local market. Its open economy gave it the 
experience of exporting its products of different business areas internationally; 
particularly oil and gas (Mardini, 2013). Similarly, the country’s financial markets have 
also developed since the early 2000’s; globalizing Qatar’s operations worldwide. 
Therefore, to maintain its position as a sturdy internationally recognized developing 
country, Qatar has adopted internationally accepted principles pertaining to corporate 
governance codes as well as internationally accepted accounting standards. Hence, it 
would be interesting to examine the level of compliance of Qatari listed companies with 
IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements in the light of their corporate governance 
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mechanisms; especially board characteristics and ownership structures. Thus, this 
thesis attempts to study the association between corporate governance structures 
(particularly board characteristics and ownership structures) and the extent of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements in a vastly developing 
Middle Eastern and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country exerting efforts to 
become a lead player in the international markets; Qatar.  
1.3 Objectives of the Study and Research Questions  
Many studies investigated the association between disclosure and firm-specific 
characteristics; namely firm age, liquidity, firm size, industry, profitability, and 
leverage (e.g. Tower, Hancock & Taplin, 1999; Street & Bryant, 2000; Glaum & Street, 
2003; Al-Shammari, Brown, & Tarca, 2008; Aljifri, Alzarouni, Ng & Tahir, 2014; 
Demir & Bahadir, 2014). However, Ho and Taylor (2013) acknowledge the general 
need for a higher number of studies to focus on the association between disclosures and 
corporate governance mechanisms; especially BOD characteristics. On a similar note, 
there were a fewer attempts to study the association between corporate governance and 
disclosures in emerging markets (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010). Likewise, corporate 
governance mechanisms on the company level have a significant effect on the 
motivation of complying with IFRS (Juhmani, 2017).  
Therefore, the main objective of this study is to examine the possible effect of 
corporate governance structures (mainly; board characteristics and ownership 
structures) on the level of compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements. 
In a similar vein, most studies investigating compliance with disclosures use the 
dichotomous scoring method (Cooke’s method) to determine the level of compliance. 
However, this study will contribute to the literature by also using the partial compliance 
scoring method in addition to the commonly used dichotomous approach to further 
examine the extent of compliance and factors affecting it under different methods of 
  
5 
 
scoring. To elaborate, the study intends to tackle the following research questions:  
1. What is the level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements by listed non-financial firms on the Qatar Stock Exchange (QSE)? 
2. Do certain board characteristics present in listed non-financial companies affect 
the level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements? 
3. Do ownership structures of listed non-financial companies affect their level of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements? 
1.4 Motivation  
Accounting is the language of business which permits global businesses, 
stakeholders and investors to adequately understand disclosed information of any 
company in the world. However, this could only be the case should there be a set 
guideline drawing on how this accounting information should be disseminated in the 
same quality, manner and language globally. Accordingly, the implementation of 
IASs/IFRSs in firms paves the way for this.  The topic underlying the quality of the 
accounting information disclosed by listed companies to investors has been chiefly 
addressed in accounting and finance literature (Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek & Nabar, 
2006). Similarly, IAS/IFRS compliance has gained importance in developed and 
developing countries with excessive research focused on the former (Alrawahi & Sarea, 
2016). Yet, the presence of financial markets worldwide portrays the level of business 
interconnectivity and the need for a uniform method of reporting information in an 
internationally comparable and comprehensible manner to all concerned entities. 
 By this, capital is a global commodity and the matter at which emerging 
economies can compete for it is by strengthening their institutions and stimulating 
reporting standards that regulate their disclosure and accounting practices (Assenso-
Okofo, Ali, & Ahmed, 2011). Therefore, there is a wide-ranging acceptance of the idea 
that the kind of accounting system plays a vital role in emerging stock market 
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development (Assenso-Okofo et al., 2011). Although implementing IAS/IFRS 
reporting standards that regulate the disclosures and accounting practices of a particular 
emerging economy is a vital step, complying with its guidelines is equally as important. 
Economically, emerging markets have usually lagged behind developed 
economies where poor disclosures and financial conditions are a characteristic of firms 
in these markets (Fan, Wei, & Xu, 2010). By implementing and more importantly 
complying with IAS/IFRS standards, emerging economies become a step closer to 
becoming a setting of research interest and Qatar cannot be omitted in this regard. 
However, it is stated that non-compliance with IAS/IFRS is more eminent in GCC 
countries than developed countries which shows the presence of limited enforcement 
of compliance of financial reporting and their oversight (Al-Shammari et al.,2008). In 
that regard, Al-Maliki et al. (2015) denotes that the Qatari landscape received only a 
handful of interest in accounting studies. Therefore, it would be interesting to study the 
level of compliance with IFRS standards in Qatar. In addition to IFRS adoption, 
corporate governance is an important topic in emerging markets. Although research 
pertaining to corporate governance has extended into developing Middle Eastern 
countries; most focused on corporate governance and its associated practices with its 
effect on firm performance.    
Therefore, the motivation of the study is to challenge and examine the 
preconceived notion and generalization of developing countries having poor 
disclosures. Also, the motive of this thesis is to tackle the research gap in the field of 
corporate governance structures and compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures 
in Qatar. Furthermore, this paper opts to examine the level of compliance with 
disclosures by using two measurement instruments as opposed to one as in extant 
studies. Also, there is a motive to emphasize the ongoing efforts of corporate 
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governance and sound compliance with internationally renowned financial standards in 
a vast developing Gulf country; Qatar. 
1.5 Significance of the Study   
Corporate governance systems have proven to be the nexus to a sound operating 
business environment; as denoted in the subsections above. Equally, a uniform set of 
accounting standards used on a global scale helps in bringing together the ease of 
understanding financial statements from different countries and appropriately assessing 
firm positions. These two fields under the accounting literature would therefore present 
a rather pragmatic argument on their importance and their association to one another. 
Additionally, since different countries have different languages, cultures, norms, laws 
and business practices; the implementation of corporate governance structures could 
also vary in different country settings.  
Since this study aims to highlight Qatari listed entities in the light of local 
corporate governance practices in companies and their compliance with IASs/IFRSs, it 
would be of particular benefit to various groups of people. Firstly, this study aims to 
assist regulatory authorities in assessing the degree of several different board 
characteristics as well as ownership structures present in listed non-financial companies 
and the extent to which they may influence the compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements. Similarly, it sets out to be of benefit to parties involved in the 
protection of stakeholder interests. Furthermore, this study could be used by leaders of 
firms to see the impact of possessing such factors on their own levels of compliance. 
Thirdly, the results of this thesis could be used by auditing companies to take into 
consideration that compliance levels are affected by governance factors. Lastly, this 
thesis would benefit future research in the realm of compliance with IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements in Qatar or the region.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter aims to illustrate and discuss the topic on a conceptual and empirical level 
to assist the overall view of the wholesome topic. The onset of this chapter will be the 
conceptual review which will highlight the concepts of corporate governance and its 
mechanisms, IAS/IFRS, and Qatar. Chapter 2 concludes with a comprehensive 
empirical review on previous studies associated with the topic of compliance with 
IAS/IFRS disclosures as well as corporate governance variables. 
2.1 Conceptual Review  
2.1.1 Corporate Governance  
A pipeline of global events have contributed to the definition of corporate 
governance over the years. It has received attention from various fields of research in 
the contexts of political science, economics, finance, accounting, philosophy, as well 
as law (ElGammal et al., 2018). Since the term sits in many subject areas with diverse 
viewpoints, corporate governance in its broadness and complexity has a wide variety 
of definitions.  
The definition mostly used for corporate governance is “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Committee, 1992). Fundamentally, 
corporate governance is the form at which power is implemented on corporate entities 
(Tricker & Tricker, 2015). This includes the formal rules, mechanisms, and regulations 
which the management of a company implements in effort to maximize the company’s 
value and minimize the agency conflict by reducing any conflicts of interests between 
insiders (directors, employees, and managers) and outsiders (shareholders, society, 
customers, among others) (Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012). However, it is important 
to denote that corporate governance differs from management in the sense that it is 
where a governing body certifies that executive management’s responsibility of running 
the entity is carried out well and in the right direction (Tricker & Tricker, 2015).  To be 
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put differently, corporate governance is also defined as the mechanisms that manifest 
an environment for ‘self-interested controllers of a firm’ (managers) to take decisions 
that are value maximizing for the owners (shareholders) (Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
In short, corporate governance regulates the bond between the firm’s stakeholders and 
management (Gebba, 2015).  
The increased interest on the importance and awareness of corporate 
governance has risen over the decades in order to achieve the protection of stakeholder 
interests while safeguarding the economic efficiency and sustainability of firms (Grant, 
2003; Crowther & Güler, 2008). As a result of several financial scandals and collapses, 
the first corporate governance codes appeared in the 1990’s in the Cadbury report of 
1992 on the financial perspective and has had a significant influence on thinking 
globally (Tricker & Tricker, 2015). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) soon followed with a proposal on the development of global 
corporate governance guidelines that aided countries to establish their individual 
corporate governance codes. These were published by the OECD under the corporate 
governance principles (Tricker & Tricker, 2015).  
The domino effect of consequences the financial events had on the world along 
with the efforts set forth by large institutions and reports drafted to tackle the problem 
have encouraged corporate governance to grow on a global scale. Therefore,  numerous 
countries set out to improve their corporate governance practices as a result of many 
corporate governance failures and the damages they had on developed and developing 
countries’ markets (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010; Al-Sartawi, 2015).  Virtually all 
developed and developing economies have established corporate governance codes or 
legislated new company laws (Tricker & Tricker, 2015).  
 
  
10 
 
2.1.2 Benefits of Corporate Governance 
On a large scale, well-designed high quality corporate governance regulations 
are significant in assisting governments attain vital policy objectives pertaining to 
higher investment levels, improved business dynamics, and amplified productivity 
levels (OECD, 2018). Likewise, it warrants that companies function in an accountable 
and responsible manner which will inevitably augment their overall performance 
(Dalwai, Basiruddin, & Abdul Rasid, 2015). Consequently, the absence of effective 
corporate governance could lead to high profile collapses; hence, sound corporate 
governance practices would aid the restoration of investor trust and the prevention of 
such collapses of reoccurring (Mallin, 2018).  
Deriving the benefits dedicated by corporate governance to the economic and 
business arena, it is safe to signify the advantages it commits to safeguarding the 
integrity of financial matters. Al-Sartawi (2017) states that the strength of the corporate 
governance system has a positive relationship with accounting choices that are 
conservative. In that essence, corporate governance would influence the level of 
transparency of disclosures made to stakeholders (Juhmani, 2013); which would have 
a positive contribution to minimizing the agency problems between principals and 
agents.  Shaheen and Nishat (2005) link corporate governance to the performance of a 
firm and indicate that those characterized by poor governance are the less profitable 
and less valuable with lower dividend payouts to shareholders.  
2.1.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Bhasa (2006) states that corporate governance lies within the framework of 
conflicts of interest (agency theory) and is thus prone to the behavioral motivation of 
the individuals running the firm. The mechanisms of corporate governance constitute 
of legal, institutional, and market settings which protect investors from the 
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opportunistic behavior of management and controlling attitudes of shareholders 
(Mollah, Al Farooque & Karim, 2012). Therefore, corporate governance includes many 
internal and external parties. These various internal and external entities impose the 
regulatory activity of corporate governance in order to protect stakeholder interests and 
resolve agency conflicts (Dalwai et al., 2015). Predominantly, corporate governance 
includes the boards’ activities and its relationship with internal parties such as 
managers, shareholders, and members; as well as external parties such as regulators, 
stakeholders, and external auditors (Tricker & Tricker, 2015). Should the protection be 
absent, information asymmetries and monitoring difficulties suffered by the investors 
would increase and would further enable the misallocation and misappropriation of 
resources by management to take place (Mollah et al., 2012). Consequently, corporate 
governance mechanisms act as a means of aid for a sound corporate governance system. 
It can be agreed that the dimensions of corporate governance continue to evolve 
while growing in complexity. However, there are certain aspects which remain in their 
importance (Tricker & Tricker, 2015). These aspects pertain to the mechanisms that 
will remain in their wholeness the pillars of a sound corporate governance system in a 
healthy organization. Dahawy (2009) states four contributing categories to the 
succession of corporate governance: ownership structure and control, financial data 
transparency, board of directors’ structure, and audit committee management. These 
mechanisms represent the scope of the corporate governance structure section of this 
thesis and are further explained below. 
Ownership Structures 
The challenges pertaining to corporate governance are determined by the overall 
institutional and developmental environment in the country generally; and by 
ownership structures specifically (Tricker & Tricker, 2015).  Ownership structures in 
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developed countries are rather dispersed whereas they are concentrated in developing 
countries (Ehikioya, 2009). To elaborate, emerging markets are commonly 
characterized by hefty government interference (Fan et.al, 2010). Governments usually 
intervene with business activities through imposing regulations, taxation or by even 
owning a fair stake in the business; referred to as state or government ownership. Shares 
owned by states cannot by transferred easily which in return impact policies, 
organizational structures of firms and managerial incentives (Alchian, 1965). Hence, 
this would have a big contribution to the overall corporate governance structure and 
level of financial disclosures published to the public as it comes in line with the needs 
of the ownership structure. 
Board of Directors Structure 
The board of directors’ presence exhibits itself as a vital role in any corporate 
governance framework. These corporate governance codes or frameworks have a vital 
role in a firm in the allocation of resources and responsibilities to influence strategic 
decisions and generate value for the company and amongst countries (Aguilera, 
Florackis & Kim, 2016).  The manner at which these governance codes are put into 
practice rests under the responsibility of the board of directors (Cadbury Committee 
Report, 1992). Additionally, the formulation of the organizations direction, policy and 
strategy lays in their jurisdiction (Tricker & Tricker, 2015). Healthy companies are 
characterized by having an effectual board of directors in the heart of their corporate 
governance structures; which plays a vital role in capital market efficiency (Alfraih, 
2016). Also, the board of directors plays the roles of advisory and monitoring by 
defining the ideals, standards, and principles as well as ensuring their place (ElGammal 
et al., 2018).  Campbell, Ghosh, Petrova and Sirmans (2011) imply that the board is a 
vital monitoring agent and especially in corporate events where interest of managers 
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are not in line with shareholder interests. The OECD (1999) states that the key 
responsibilities of the board are ensuring sufficient returns to shareholders, monitoring 
management performance, balancing challenging demands and preventing conflicts of 
interest. By having this advisory and monitoring role, it could be derived that in firms 
where boards are effective, management is inclined to disclose information to investors 
and sustaining the financial reporting quality (Hashim & Devi, 2008; Alfraih, 2016). 
Entities with competent corporate governance structures are habitually 
characterized by having a rather balanced board of non-independent and independent 
directors whom contribute to the continuous success of the company by the use of their 
apposite knowledge and expertise and whom also possess the confidence to raise query 
on issues that may not be in the company’s best interests. Additionally, diversity of 
thought throughout the board should be guaranteed by diversifying the board in the 
context of gender, education, experience as well as age. Furthermore, ensuring that the 
roles of the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman are not taken by one individual is 
necessary. This is because the common perception of the matter is that a sole individual 
retaining both roles would wield excessive power in the organization (Mallin, 2018).   
Disclosure (Financial Data Transparency) 
One of the eminent factors with a concrete role in corporate governance is 
disclosure as it facilitates transparent information to investors and is vital to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of capital markets (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Al-Sartwai, 
2017). As emphasized by the OECD principles, financial reporting and disclosures are 
the key mechanisms of corporate governance to decrease information asymmetry 
(Leung & Ilsever, 2013). Most of the disclosures are mandatory whilst others are 
voluntary. Mandatory disclosures are those disclosure which are required by 
professional regulations, listing requirements as well as the statute (Aljifri et al., 2014). 
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The topic of corporate disclosures and their determinants attracted the 
attentiveness of researchers in the theoretical and empirical studies since the 1970’s 
(Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). These disclosures are provided by companies through the 
use of different mediums such as their websites, annual reports, or by the use of 
quarterly financial reports which disclose aspects like managerial decisions and 
analysis, footnotes and filings pertaining to regulations and most importantly, in 
financial statements (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  Thus, disclosures take a front-line 
position in their importance as a mechanism of corporate governance.  
2.1.4 Corporate Governance in Developing Countries  
Countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have witnessed 
an ample progression in their corporate governance frameworks over the past decade 
(Amico, 2014). However, one of the eminent MENA corporate governance weaknesses 
which could be characterized as having the most palpable impact on investment 
attraction lies in the regions insufficient disclosure practices; in spite of the 
comparability of disclosure requirements with other emerging markets (Amico, 2014). 
The local corporate governance quality is extremely vital for accomplishing long-term 
developmental efforts in the developing world today (Oman & Blume, 2005). Those 
corporate governance systems within a country encompass the overall formal and 
informal rules, accepted private and public practices and implementation methods 
which regulate the relationships between corporate insiders and those who invest 
resources in the corporation (Hassaan, 2013a). 
2.1.5 International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS)  
The consequences of globalization witnessed by the worlds’ economy led to 
specific accounting problems to be emphasized. One of the concerns highlighted are 
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issues pertaining to the evident differences in the accounting reports in different 
countries (Samaha & Khlif, 2016). Thus, the pursuit for the transnational harmonization 
of accounting practices and standards have been accepted as advantageous and realistic 
(Chamisa, 2000; Samaha & Stapleton, 2009; Khlif & Souissi, 2010; Samaha & Khlif, 
2016).  
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC); later restructured 
as International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was established to develop 
standards which signify as a single set of high quality mandatory standards that call for 
internationally understandable, comparable and transparent information in financial 
statements. In order to increase the financial statements’ levels of comparability, 
transparency and consistency, the former IASC issued the International Accounting 
Standards (IASs) where in later years the IASB issued International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) which consider financial statements to be a tool in the 
delivering of information pertaining to the financial position and performance. 
The globalization of the economy and financial market acts as a motivation for 
the implementation of IAS/IFRS in listed entities. In return, this creates consistent, 
comparable, and transparent accounting practices which allows investors to compare 
corporations worldwide as a result of the decrease in information asymmetries (Latifah, 
Asfadillah & Sukmana, 2012). Subsequent to the adoption of IASs/IFRSs in Europe, 
the consideration of changing to IFRS and the economic consequences of doing so have 
increased in their impetus (Judge, Li & Pinsker, 2010). Among those in debate to adopt 
IAS/IFRS were professionals and policy makers in developing countries whose ability 
to attract foreign investments has been impeded given the poor quality of financial 
reporting (Samaha & Khlif, 2016). Furthermore, the globalization of the international 
economies has aided compliance with IAS/IFRS in developing and emerging countries 
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characterized by economies that are market-based (Ben Othman & Kossentini, 2015).  
Therefore, over the past years, many developing countries have adopted the accounting 
standards of IFRS (Joshi & Ramadhan, 2002; Samaha & Khlif, 2016) regardless of the 
view that effective accounting and reporting systems are only mirrored through the 
context in which they function (Hopwood, 1979; Choi & Mueller, 1992; Dahawy & 
Samaha, 2010).   
The vast adoption of IFRS comes from the benefits of complying with 
disclosing information to the markets as it is argued that there are significant incentives 
like foreign investment attraction or lowered market risks should disclosures be done 
in emerging economies (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994). All in all, the adoption of 
IASs/IFRSs contributes to more condensed accounting choices and an upsurge in 
disclosures which increases investor protection and reduces private benefits of the 
insiders in a company.  Mere adoption of IAS/IFRS may not contribute to the intended 
results should there be a lack of full compliance with the financial reporting standards 
(Bova & Pereira, 2012) or with standards disclosure requirements (Juhmani, 2017). 
Therefore, compliance with these standards is necessary to safeguard the quality of 
financial reports and their usefulness to the stakeholders of the organization who call 
for increased accountability (Benjamin, 2008). 
2.1.6 Qatar  
Qatar is one of the vastly growing developing countries worldwide with a stock 
exchange determined to be an exchange leader in the GCC (Qatar Exchange, 2017). 
The country’s stable macroeconomic environment was driven by low government debt 
and budget surplus as a result of energy exports revenue (GCI, 2016). In a similar vein,  
it withheld its position as the second-most competitive economy amongst the Arab 
nations in the years of 2017-2018 (World Economic Forum, 2018).  Based on data from 
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Qatar’s Planning and Statistics Authority (2018), Qatar’s real GDP growth rate over 
the years in the study sample were 3.6%, 2.2%, and 1.6% for 2015, 2016, 2017, 
respectively. ‘Qatar Economic Update’ by The World Bank states that growth in the 
nation showed its weakest figure in over two decades of 1.6% in the year of 2017 as a 
result of the diplomatic rift with neighboring GCC countries. It further attested that 
redirection of trade, introduction of the new port, and infrastructure spending associated 
with the FIFA World Cup 2022  helped the economy recover. Therefore, impacts of the 
ongoing rift are considered short-lived as the economy is expected to grow (The World 
Bank, 2019).  
In order to properly and fairly reflect the economic environment of the country, 
this thesis finds it important to reflect the situation prior to and after the embargo 
situation Qatar witnessed in the middle of 2017.  Qatar’s rank in the Global Competitive 
Index (GCI) portrayed the countries advancing performance and keen position in 
economic growth as well as its overall competitive stance over the years identified in 
this thesis (2015, 2016, and 2017). The GCI is an annually published report by the 
World Economic Forum which notes the performance of countries on a number of 
pillars of competitiveness. These include but are not limited to infrastructure, health 
and primary education, institutions, developed financial markets and others. Qatar was 
in the lead of the MENA region as it ranked first amongst them in the GCI for the 
periods of 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. Its rank fell to second in 2016 – 2017, and to 
third in the MENA in 2017-2018. In terms of its worldwide position,  the country held 
a considerably steady position in the years between 2012 to 2016 and slightly curtailed 
in its ranking in the subsequent years. The change in the drop in its ranking down to the 
25th place  in 2018 from the preceding years’ ranking of 18 was initially a result of the 
fall in oil and gas prices that influenced Qatar’s situation in fiscal aspects (World 
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Economic Forum, 2018).  
According to the World Bank (2019), Qatar’s economy is expected to maintain 
its positive stance with an anticipation of a 3.4% growth by the year of 2021 with the 
approach of the FIFA World Cup. Moreover, the world bank states that the high 
infrastructure spending to diversify the economy and the projects related to the Qatar 
National Vision 2030 will counterbalance any fall in investment spending exerted on 
the FIFA projects. 
Corporate governance disclosure is believed to be extremely vital for countries 
who aspire to attract investors from the international setting and spread foreign 
investment (Shehata, 2017). On that note, Qatari efforts to attract foreign investments 
are eminent as a result of its openness to allow for them. The year of 2010 witnessed 
the expansion of foreign investor roles under Investment Law No. 1 which permitted 
the possibility of complete foreign ownership of business activities (Mardini, Tahat & 
Power, 2018). The efforts exerted by the country into attracting foreign investment into 
the country cannot go unnoticed. In 2019, Qatar implemented the International 
Monetary Funds Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS) in its launch 
of the National Summary Data Page which opts to improve data transparency and form 
a synergy among surveillance and dissemination. Therefore, this will give stakeholders 
that are both national and international as well as policy makers the ease of accessing 
this information (IMF, 2019).  
One of Qatar’s most recent efforts to improve investor trust as well as further 
attract local and foreign investment in listed entities is by the issuance of the QSE 
mandatory investor relations requirements enforced on the onset of October 2019. The 
new investor relation rules came as a result of feedback from international and local 
investors whom implied that listed entities on the QSE are not committing sufficiently 
  
19 
 
in that area, in return affecting the trust in the market. Therefore, intensifying the need 
to comply with reporting standards. 
As a result of the heightened efforts to attract investors, applying amplified 
corporate governance practices and complying with international accounting standards 
is of utmost importance; signifying the importance of this thesis topic to the country 
setting of Qatar. Therefore, it would be interesting to study a vastly developing 
country’s efforts in complying with internationally renowned, followed and accepted 
accounting standards. Furthermore, given the diplomatic unrest the region, it would be 
enlightening to see how vigilantly these mandatory reporting standards have been 
followed before and during an unexpected time of unease in the state of Qatar.  
2.1.7 Corporate Governance in Qatar  
Corporate governance mechanisms listed entities in Qatar are expected to 
follow are underlined in the ‘Governance Code for Companies & Legal Entities Listed 
on the Main Market’ (‘the Code’) document issued by the Qatar Financial Markets 
Authority (QFMA) (QFMA, 2016). The Governance Code denotes that one of the vital 
management and control systems for companies, shareholding companies and 
especially legally listed entities in financial markets, is the concept of ‘governance’. 
The Qatari governance code describes governance as the factor that promotes 
transparency and disclosure, regulates stakeholder rights, promotes equality amongst 
stakeholders, and encourages the advancement and development of the society.  It also 
denotes that governance may lead to the improvement of company performance and 
upholds the interests of the company’s stakeholders firstly, followed by those of the 
public and the company. 
The relevance of the code trickles through the fact that it is based on best 
international codes of governance principles such as the ones developed by the OECD 
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in 2015, G20, The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 2015, the International 
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) in 2014; and lastly, by regional codes under 
the unified guiding principles for corporate governance for companies listed in the GCC 
in 2012.  This highlights the Qatari efforts to develop and internationalize its systems 
of governance in line with international best practices; which may lead to an increase 
in foreign investments and investor trust.  
2.1.8 Accounting and Financial Reporting Setting in Qatar  
As it is true that Qatar’s economy has grown, the accounting systems in the 
country changed but at a different pace (Al-Shammari et al., 2008). Some studies 
contend that accounting and reporting systems will be effective once they mirror the 
setting in which they function (Rahman, 2005). In a similar vein, the level of a firms 
compliance with the regulatory requirements as well as legal ones relies on how strict 
the government, regulatory or professional organization (Marston & Shivers, 1991; 
Aljifri et al., 2014). Therefore, the first part of this subsection will highlight the legal 
framework under which the accounting systems function.  
A firms financial reporting quality is largely influenced by the financial 
reporting regulations of the country to which the firm belongs to (Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002). Therefore, the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosures are undoubtedly 
affected by the regulatory mechanisms in the country (Boshnak, 2017). By that, the 
IASB does not have enforcement powers in any country and will thus rely on the local 
regulatory authorities to do so (Alali & Cao, 2010). The importance of compliance with 
financial reporting and disclosures in the state of Qatar radiates through the several laws 
which propagate their need. Brown (2011) denotes that the recognition of the benefits 
of IAS/IFRS adoption rely on external factors such as regulatory and legal support as 
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well as monitoring compliance levels. These aspects are clear in the Qatari 
environment. 
The legal framework pertaining to financial reporting in the country is founded 
on a number of company laws and listing requirements which have been provisioned 
over the past few decades (Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Al-Mannai & Hindi, 2015, 
Mardini & Tahat, 2017). The first company law was issued in 1981 by the Ministry of 
Economy and Commerce (MEC) known as Company Law No. 11 of 1981 which 
instructed businesses with local operations to prepare an income statement and 
statement of financial position on an annual basis but did not clarify the contents of the 
financial statements or matters relating to which accounting standards they should 
follow (Mardini et al., 2018).   
The Qatari jurisdiction has publicly committed towards realizing IFRS as the 
single set of high quality global accounting standards which has been highlighted 
through several notions. The adoption of IASs in Qatar started in 1999 under the 
encouragement of the Central Bank of Qatar (CBQ) following the adoption of Doha 
Securities Market Law No. 1 of 1995; the securities law (Mardini, 2013). However, 
Company Law No. 5 of 2002 is considered the fundamental law supporting company 
financial disclosures (Mardini et al., 2018). This law, as opposed to Company Law No. 
11, clearly states the need for companies to hold documents, records, and accounts ‘in 
accordance with the accounting principles approved internationally’. These accounting 
principles have been defined as the IFRS standards under the regulations emphasized 
by the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA, 2016). Therefore, Company Law 
No. 5 dictated the necessity of listed entities to comply with IFRS in relation to the 
contents of their annual reports and financial reports; emphasizing the requirement of 
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companies to present their investors with relevant, detailed and timely financial 
information (Mardini et al., 2018).  
In addition to a few laws on the use of IFRS, the conformity with the standards 
has been further highlighted by several QFMA rulebooks, particularly; the QFMA 
Offering and Listing Rulebook of Securities and the QFMA Offering and Listing 
Rulebook of Securities “Second Market”. QFMA is the authority in Qatar which has 
the legal right to exercise its full power under Law No. 33 of 2005 as well as the rules 
and regulations it issues in order to achieve its regulatory objectives in line with 
international standards to establish a leading financial market in the country and to 
foster the understanding of the financial market amongst investors and other concerned 
individuals (QFMA, 2008 Regulations Board decision No. 1 of 2008, Article 2).  
The importance of complying with disclosures by listed entities in Qatar is also 
highlighted in Law No. 8 of 2012 of QFMA. The law highlights the responsibility of 
its board for setting and overseeing the conditions and procedures in the context of 
offering securities to the public on the market where they contain accurate, sufficient 
and comprehensive disclosed information that may be of interest to investors (Item 4 
of Article 30, Law No.8 of 2012). 
Qatari Stock Exchange 
The Doha Securities Market was established in the year of 1997 as a result of 
the introduction of the Doha Securities Market Law No. 14 of 1995 by the MEC 
(Mardini et al., 2018). The QSE was established in the state of Qatar in 1995 and is 
regulated by the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) (QE, 2017). The exchange 
listing requirements require companies to have reports prepared in the light of the IFRS 
and International Accounting Standards (IAS) (QE, 2017). Furthermore, listed 
companies are regulated by QFMA under law No. 8 of 2012 in which the authority can 
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set the requirements for financial statement preparation in line with IFRS; mentioned 
previously.   
The Qatar Stock Exchange highlighted that one of the requirements for the 
admission of securities to trading is that the issuer of the securities must have 
consolidated published or filed audited annual financial statements in line with IFRS. 
Additionally, in terms of disclosures, the QSE underlines the disclosure obligations of 
which the issuer of securities on the stock exchange must adhere to. When an entity 
applies for admissions to trade on the exchange, it is expected to comply with the 
obligations under applicable Qatari laws (Law. No. 5 ) in the light of ‘initial, ongoing 
or ad hoc disclosure obligations’.  The first addressed item was that the issuer should 
ensure not to disclose any misleading or confidential information (QSE, 2015).  
Other rules, regulations and provisions assigned by the QSE on the subject of 
the board of directors and their duties, board compositions, voting rights and others are 
listed in the “Governance Code for Companies & Legal Entities Listed on the Main 
Market” or the ‘governance code’ book by the QFMA in line with Decision No. (5) of 
2016 (QE, 2017; QFMA, 2017).  This code obeys the basis of ‘comply or explain’ 
which is applicable to all listed entities (Shehata, 2015). Furthermore, the QSE follows 
Law No. 11 of 2015 ‘Promulgating the Commercial Companies Law’ and provides 
guidance on ESG reporting. These rules will be discussed in further detail in the 
following sections.  
The Qatari stock exchange has 46 listed companies as of the year of 2019 which 
are distributed amongst seven sectors which are: Banking & Financial Services, 
Consumer Goods & Services, Industrials, Insurance, Real Estate, Telecoms and 
Transportation; in that order. All listed companies in the QSE should have a minimum 
capital of 40 million Qatari Riyals subscribed and are expected to abide by the rules 
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and regulations set by the QSE as per the ‘Listing Requirements for Equity Securities 
Guide’ of 2011. 
This subsection underlined the legal and economic landscape of the State of 
Qatar to put into perspective the importance of adopting and complying with disclosure 
requirements asserted by international accounting standards in a vast developing 
country proving its presence in the international business environment. The efforts set 
to attract foreign investments, invest in foreign countries, develop financial markets, 
and propel economically also convey the hidden operational efforts to further advance 
the sphere of accounting and reporting that support these efforts. This subsection 
conveyed the long existent and ongoing efforts by the law and regulatory entities on the 
compliance with proper financial reporting and disclosure practices, recognition of the 
IFRS as the single set of international accounting standards to follow, and the 
importance of appropriate corporate governance practices in the country. All in all, this 
section acts as a backbone of persuasion to the purpose of studying this topic as it is 
rather interesting to bring an extremely vast economically developing gulf country to 
the grounds of accounting studies by examining selected factors that determine the level 
of compliance with international accounting standards disclosure requirements; to 
further note the extent of development in accounting in the country.  
2.2 Empirical Review   
This section of the literature review chapter sets to highlight and examine all 
previous studies conducted on the topic of mandatory compliance with IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements in developed as well as developing countries. It will also shed 
a light on all previous studies that are of relevance to the topic at hand under the 
umbrellas of either disclosure compliance (under IAS/IFRS or local accounting 
standards disclosure requirements), corporate governance factors, or IAS/IFRS related 
studies in developing countries in general, and Qatar in particular. By this, this section 
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will highlight the gap in literature amongst those studies conducted in Qatar and will 
also highlight those weaknesses in studies done in developing countries to better 
augment the objectives and motives of this thesis.  
 2.2.1 Studies in Developed Countries  
Research conducted on the grounds of company compliance with financial 
disclosures requirements that took place in developed western countries include ones 
in the USA (Nobes, 1990; Street & Bryant, 2000; Street & Gray, 2002), Germany 
(Glaum & Street, 2003), New Zealand (Yeoh, 2005), Australia (Taylor, Tower, Van 
Der Zahn & Neilson, 2008); Hungary (Fekete et al., 2008), UK (Watson, Shrives & 
Marston, 2002; Iatridis, 2008) Greece (Galani, Alexandridis, & Stavropoulos, 2011; 
Tsalavoutas, André, & Evans, 2012) and Spain (Wallace, Naser, & Mora, 1994).  
Most, if not all, of the aforementioned studies focused on firm characteristics 
and their association to the extent of compliance with disclosure requirements or 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in general. Firm characteristics 
usually addressed in studies examining compliance with mandatory disclosures include 
firm size, firm age, profitability, liquidity, industry type and other firm related 
characteristics. For instance, Street and Bryant (2000) investigated the association 
between certain factors such as listing status, profitability and industry type and IAS 
disclosures in US listed entities. Similarly, Street and Gray (2002) also studied various 
firm characteristics (profitability, size, auditor and industry type, and listing status) and 
compliance with IAS in US listed firms.  In Greece (Galani et al., 2011) found that only 
size of a firm is associated with the level of compliance with disclosures in 2009 for 43 
listed Greek companies. Likewise, in Hungary, Fekete et al. (2008) studied the extent 
of compliance with mandatory IFRS and the firm characteristics factors that influence 
this compliance. However, this thesis opts to study corporate governance factors such 
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as board characteristics and ownership structures on the extent of disclosure 
compliance, as opposed to several studies in developed countries examined compliance 
with mandatory disclosures in general and with some ownership and board structure 
variables.  
Malone, Fries, and Jones (1993) examined the extent of financial disclosures in 
125 firms of the oil and gas industry in the US. Their study focused on several firm 
characteristics such as profitability, total assets, audit firm size, and listing status on the 
extent of financial disclosures. Additionally, the authors examined ownership structure 
in the light of number of shareholders and its association to the extent of financial 
disclosures. Their results read that entities with higher debt/equity, higher number of 
shareholders, and listing in major stock exchanges are associated with higher financial 
disclosures; whilst other variables are not supported. 
Glaum and Street (2003) set out to examine the factors affecting IAS disclosure 
requirements. They found that ownership diffusion has no association to the level of 
compliance with mandatory IAS disclosures. Yeoh (2005) examined the compliance 
with the 495 mandated items in listing rules, Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs) and 
Statements of Standard Accounting Practices (SSAPs) of 39 listed non-financial entities 
on the New Zealand Stock Exchange for the period ranging from 1996 to 1998.  The 
author documents that the overall compliance is higher with SSAP than FRSs and 
listing rules. Crowley (2011) examined the compliance levels with mandatory IFRS 
disclosures in 75 companies from EU15 countries for the year of 2009. With a 
disclosure checklist of a total of 42 IFRS disclosures,  the author finds that there is no 
significant influence of foreign ownership on the compliance with IFRS disclosures. 
2.2.2 Studies in Developing Countries  
There is a mix of literature in the context of mandatory disclosure compliance 
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in several aspects in developing country settings. The variation in the literature presents 
itself in the disclosure requirements addressed in the studies such as those mandatory 
items dictated by IAS/IFRS requirements, local accounting practices, or others in line 
with disclosure requirements determined by best practices. Additionally, the variation 
amongst the studies exists in the determinants of disclosure compliance studied where 
a hefty amount of attention has been poured onto corporate characteristics (firm age 
and size, industry, profitability, liquidity and auditor type) rather than any other 
determinants such as cultural factors or the determinants set to be studied in this thesis 
particularly; board characteristics and ownership structures.  
Several studies were conducted on firms in developing countries on the topic of 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure compliance over the past decade; with the exception 
of Wallace and Naser (1995), Samaha and Stapleton (2009), Rahman, Ismail & Hussin 
(2011) and Holtz and Neto (2014), whose studies were based on mandatory compliance 
with local or best practice accounting standards. Studies on mandatory IAS/IFRS 
disclosure compliance were based  in countries of the GCC such as: Kuwait (Al 
Mutawaa & Hewaidy, 2010; Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011; Alfraih, 2016), United Arab 
Emirates (Aljifri et al., 2014), Bahrain (Sarea & Dalal, 2015; Alrawahi & Sarea, 2016; 
Al-Sartawi, Alrawahi & Sanad, 2016; Juhmani, 2017); Qatar (Tahat, Mardini & 
Haddad, 2018), GCC countries (Al-Shammari et al., 2008); other countries in the 
MENA region: Jordan (Naser et al, 2002; Al-Shiab, 2003; Al-Akra et al., 2010; 
Hassaan, 2013a; Mardini, Tahat & Power, 2013; Mardini & Power, 2015; Tahat, 
Mardini & Power, 2017), Egypt (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Samaha & Stapleton, 
2009; Hassaan, 2013b; Shehata, Dahawy, & Ismail, 2014; Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015). 
Likewise, studies in Asia: Bangladesh (Ahmed & Karim, 2005), China (Peng, Tondkar, 
van der Laan Smith & Harless, 2008) Hong Kong (Wallace & Naser, 1995), Malaysia 
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(Abdullah, Evans, Fraser, & Tsalavoutas, 2015; Abdul Rahman & Hamdan, 2019), 
Indonesia (Krismiaji and Surifah, 2019) and Africa, particularly: Zimbabwe (Owusu-
Ansah, 1998) Ghana (Agyei-Mensah, 2013; Yiadom & Atsunyo, 2014; Appiah, 
Awunyo-Vitor, Mireku & Ahiagbah, 2016; Agyei-Mensah, 2017) Kenya (Bova & 
Pereira, 2012); and Uganda (Nalukenge, Nkundabanyanga & Ntayi, 2018). Also, 
Turkey (Demir & Bahadir, 2014), Brazil (Santos, Ponte, & Mapurunga, 2013) and 
group or cross country studies (Tower et al., 1999; Craig & Diga, 1998).  
However, as the aforementioned, a majority of the above mentioned studies 
examined the compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements or with 
other mandatory local accounting practices under the realm of firm characteristics as 
determinants of compliance with disclosures. On the other hand, only a handful of the 
above mentioned studies associated other factors as determinants of mandatory 
disclosure compliance (IAS/IFRS or local accounting standards disclosure 
requirements) which included elements of corporate governance factors such as board 
characteristics and ownership structures. 
Studies which examined the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements are by Naser et al. (2002), 
AlShammari et al. (2008); Hassaan (2013a); Hassaan (2013b); Al-Akra et al. (2010), 
Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011), Aljifri et al. (2014), Abdullah et al. (2015) ; Ebrahim 
and Fattah (2015), Alfraih (2016); Juhmani (2016); Fernandes (2017); Agyei-Mensah 
(2017); Al-Sartawi et al. (2017); Nalukenge (2018). Other studies which are considered 
of relevancy to the topic of corporate governance mechanisms as factors of the level of 
compliance with required disclosures were done so under local accounting standards. 
Those studies were in Hong Kong (Wallace & Naser, 1995), Malaysia (Rahman, Ismail 
& Hussin, 2011) Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah, 1998) and Brazil (Holtz & Neto, 2014) 
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and cross country studies (Craig & Diga, 1998). These studies will be further 
highlighted in a forthcoming section.  
Al-Shammari et al. (2008) conducted a GCC wide study between the years of 
1996 and 2002 on 137 listed GCC entities to find the extent of compliance with  
mandatory IAS disclosures. The authors also examined the factors which influence the 
extent of compliance with several firm characteristics as well as one significant 
corporate governance factor examined in this thesis: ownership diffusion. The results 
of their study revealed that institutional ownership has no significant impact on the 
compliance with IAS disclosures.  Although this study shed a light on the country 
setting of Qatar, it did not examine corporate governance mechanisms that the current 
thesis opts to, except for one variable of ownership diffusion, per se. 
Al-Akra et al. (2010) examined the influence of corporate governance variables 
(namely; ownership structures, non-executive directors, board size, and audit 
committee) on compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosures in 80 listed Jordanian 
companies between 1996 and 2004. The authors report that the size of the board and 
presence of an audit committee were significant determinants of compliance with 
mandatory IFRS disclosures. However, they found that ownership structures and 
number of non-executive directors are insignificant in effecting disclosures.  
Alanezi & Albuloushi (2011) conducted a study in Kuwait in the field of IFRS-
required disclosure. Their study included various independent variables associated with 
firm characteristics, ownership diffusion as well as other governance mechanisms. 
They conclude that the presence of a voluntary audit committee is significantly and 
positively related to the level of IFRS required disclosures. They also find no significant 
relationship between firm size, age, and profitability on IFRS required disclosures.   
Hassaan (2013a) conducted an investigation to find the impact of the structures 
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of corporate governance on the extent of compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure 
requirements on entities listed in Jordan. The author constructed a disclosure index 
consisting of mandatory disclosure requirements in the year of 2007 to measure the 
compliance levels of firms. The corporate governance structures studied in the paper 
are board characteristics (independence, size, and leadership) as well as the ownership 
structure (ratios of: management, government, private and public ownerships). The 
authors results claimed a lack of impact of those corporate governance’s structures on 
compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements.  
In a similar context, Hassaan (2013b) also investigated the effect of the 
introduction of the  2005 corporate governance code on the compliance with mandatory 
IFRS disclosure requirements in listed companies in Egypt. Basing the study on the 
same year of 2007, the author formed a disclosure index of the IFRS disclosure 
requirements of that year to measure the compliance levels. As in the case of Jordan, 
the author found a lack of influence of the corporate governance structures on the 
compliance level with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements.  
Aljifri et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between certain characteristics 
and mandatory corporate financial disclosures (relating to both IAS/IFRS and local 
disclosure requirements) in 153 listed and unlisted public joint stock firms in the UAE. 
Although this study included a hefty number of firm specific variables as determinants 
of compliance (industry type, ROE, liquidity, listing status and capitalization), it also 
included corporate governance factors such as foreign ownership, audit committee 
presence and non-executive directors. The results of this study found firm specific 
characteristics (namely: industry type, listing status, and firm size) have a significant 
association with level of compliance with mandatory disclosure. All three factors were 
found to have no association with the compliance with mandatory IFRS/local disclosure 
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items.  
Abdullah et al. (2015) examined the levels of mandatory IFRS disclosures and 
the effects of family control on them on a sample of 221 Malaysian companies for the 
year of 2008. Similar to the measurement approaches used in this thesis, Abdullah et 
al. (2015) used both scoring methods: dichotomous scoring (Cooke’s method) and 
partial compliance to examine the level of  compliance with mandatory disclosure of 
259 index items. They depict that family control is negatively related to the extent of 
disclosure. This study is one of the very few that examine the level of mandatory 
IAS/IFRS disclosure in the light of two scoring methods which this thesis aims to 
accomplish. However, it did not highlight more of the corporate governance 
mechanisms set to be examined in this thesis such as board diversity, multiple 
directorships and ownership structures.   
Ebrahim & Fattah (2015) conducted a study on 116 listed Egyptian companies 
in 2007 where they examined factors of corporate governance and audit quality as the 
determinants of compliance with IFRS income tax disclosure requirements, namely 
IAS 12 and Egyptian Accounting Standard 24 (EAS 24). By using a regression analysis, 
the authors found that entities with higher foreign board members and institutional 
ownership  have an effect on complying with disclosure requirements.  
Alfraih (2016) investigated the association between board of directors’ 
characteristics and compliance with mandatory disclosures in the light of IFRS 
requirements in listed companies in Kuwait for the year of 2010. The extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures was measured by an item-based index. 
Furthermore, the author chose to study the characteristics of CEO duality, gender 
diversity, multiple directorships, family members, presence of members of the Kuwait 
ruling family and the number of members on the board. A regression model was used 
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to test the hypotheses where it was found that gender diversity, multiple directorships, 
and board size are positively associated with the extent of compliance; and all other 
variables were negatively associated with compliance.  
Al-Sartawi et al. (2016) conducted a study in Bahrain to investigate the 
relationship between the characteristics of the board and the compliance level with 
mandatory disclosure requirements under IAS 1 by listed firms in Bahrain. The authors 
approached the investigation by using a disclosure index for the measurement of the 
compliance level with IAS 1 and a multiple linear regression model to measure the 
degree of the relationship of the characteristics with the mandatory disclosure 
requirements. The results of their study indicate a significant negative association 
between board size, stockholder ownerships, and CEO non-duality with compliance 
with IAS 1 disclosures. 
Juhmani (2017) examined the association between corporate governance and 
IFRS disclosure a year prior to the first Bahraini corporate governance code was 
published. The author used eight corporate governance mechanisms as independent 
variables; board independence, audit committee independence, CEO duality, audit 
committee size, board size, managerial ownership, government ownership and block-
holder ownership. The findings portray the existence of a relationship between the first 
three mechanisms board independence, CEO duality and audit committee independence 
with IFRS disclosures. Thus, indicating that the latter five mechanisms have no 
association with the level of IFRS disclosures.  
Agyei-Mensah (2017) conducted an investigation to find the compliance level 
with disclosure requirements pertaining to risk under IFRS 7 by firms listed in Ghana 
over a period of three years. The author hypothesizes the negative association of board 
size, independent directors, block-holder ownership, institutional ownership, and audit 
  
33 
 
committee independence, with the extent and quality of risk disclosure compliance. The 
results of the study document a significant positive association between the proportion 
of non-executive directors and IFRS 7 disclosures. Similarly, board size was found to 
have a significant positive correlation with the compliance with risk disclosure quality. 
An extant study with a high level of similarity to this thesis is the dissertation 
by Boshnak (2017) in which the author comprehensively investigated the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures and factors which influence them in the GCC 
through the years of 2010 to 2013. The factors studied in the research included firm 
characteristics, ownership factors, board characteristics and cultural aspects. In 
harmony with other studies, the author self-constructed a disclosure indices with all 
required disclosure items; mandatory and voluntary.  After running a regression 
analysis, the author depicts that the levels of disclosures across the GCC vary. The 
results also show that factors such international listing, size of the firm, age, state 
ownership, board independence and the level of director and financial controller 
education positively affect the levels of mandatory disclosures. The author also states 
that eminent differences were present across different countries and through the sample 
period. Although this study did in fact cover the country setting of Qatar and shed a 
light on the topic of the current thesis, it differs on several grounds. The current thesis 
provides a focused and in depth view on Qatar with a larger sample size chosen for it 
as opposed to focusing on the whole GCC and giving minor attention to Qatar with a 
total of 44 listed entities across four years in the study of Boshnak (2017).  Additionally, 
the study deployed by Boshnak (2017) focused on the four years ranging between 2010-
2013, whereas this thesis will focus on more recent years’ findings, specifically the 
years of 2015, 2016, 2017, to capture the essence of compliance efforts set forth in the 
country that is working on vastly developing and attracting investments. Moreover, this 
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thesis paper will employ two measurements of compliance rather than one as used by 
Boshnak (2017).  
Nalukenge et al. (2018) conducted a research on microfinance institutions in 
Uganda to find the relationship between corporate governance, ethical culture, internal 
controls over financial reporting and the compliance with IFRS. To measure corporate 
governance, the authors used board financial expertise, board independence, and board 
role performance. By conducting surveys, they found that corporate governance as well 
as the other two studied factors have contributed significantly to compliance with IFRS. 
In a more recent study conducted in Indonesia, Krismiaji and Surifah (2019) 
examined the effects of different corporate governance on the levels of compliance with 
disclosures of IFRSs in 2013 and 2014. The authors used several proxies for corporate 
governance such as board structure,  ownership structure and audit committee 
characteristics. They find that the independence and size of the board, the size and 
independence of the audit committee and ownership by management positively impact 
the level of compliance with IFRS disclosures.  
In Brazil, Fernandes (2017) investigated board characteristics in the sense of 
internationality on the board and the level of compliance with IFRS 3 disclosure 
requirements. The author finalizes that foreign board members and training abroad  
contribute to higher compliance with mandatory IFRS 3 disclosure requirements. 
On a similar premise, some studies investigated the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms such as board characteristics, ownership structures 
and compliance with local accounting standards. For instance, Wallace and Naser 
(1995) examined the level of compliance with mandatory disclosures by Honk Kong 
Statements of Standard Accounting Practices (HK SSAP) in Hong Kong. Although 
most of their variables are related to firm characteristics, they did also study the effect 
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of having shares held by outsiders in which they found no impact of the variable on 
mandatory disclosures.   
Owusu-Ansah (1998) conducted a study on 49 listed companies in Zimbabwe 
for the year of 1994  to find the impact of several corporate variables on the extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures under listing rules, Companies Act, as well as 
IASs. The results of the study depict that the size and age of the company, ownership 
structure, and profitability have a positive significant impact on mandatory disclosure 
practices.  
In the same vein, Rahman et al. (2011) studied the factors which affect the 
degree of  compliance with disclosure requirements of the Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board (MASB) in 170 listed companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange in 2004. By employing ordinary least square regression model, their results 
indicate that only the firm characteristic of leverage has a positive association with the 
level of compliance. Corporate governance factors such as board independence, CEO 
duality, audit committee independence, block-holder ownership have no significant 
association with compliance.  
Most of the studies which set out to examine the influence of corporate 
governance factors (namely: board characteristics and ownership structures) in 
developing countries; did so in relation to voluntary disclosures rather than mandatory 
disclosures. These studies were done in China (Huafang & Jiango, 2007); Bahrain 
(Juhmani, 2013); Jordan (Alhazaimeh, Palaniappan & Almsafir, 2013; Sartawi, 
Hindawi, Bsoul & Ali, 2014; Haddad, AlShattarat, AbuGhazaleh & Nobanee, 2015; 
Albawwat & Basah, 2015); Egypt (Soliman, Ragab & Eldin, 2014); Turkey (Karagül 
& Yönet, 2012); Kuwait (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010); Malaysia (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). Hence, it could be deduced that most of the 
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studies using corporate governance and ownership structures as determinants are 
usually more or less on the side of voluntary disclosures rather than mandatory. This 
could be justified as voluntary disclosures are not an obligation entities need to comply 
with, and hence would depend, on a large extent, on the boards’ willingness to disclose 
extra information to the public. Along the same line, most researchers studied corporate 
governance mechanisms (board characteristics and ownership structures) and their link 
to firm performance (e.g: Connelly & Limpaphayom, 2004; O’connell & Cramer, 2010; 
Mollah et al., 2012; Shukeri, Shin & Shaari, 2012; Gaur, Bathula & Singh, 2015; Johl, 
Kaur & Cooper, 2015).  
Based on the above, the corporate governance factors chosen for this thesis were 
previously mostly associated with studies on voluntary disclosures in developing 
countries; adding uniqueness to the thesis topic at hand which investigates board 
characteristics and ownership structures in the light of mandatory IFRS disclosures.   
2.2.3 Studies in Qatar  
This  subsection of the empirical review will highlight all relevant studies that 
were based in Qatar under multiple topics in the fields of IAS/IFRS, reporting, 
compliance, and corporate governance. This is done in order to highlight the results of 
the past studies in the country and most importantly to highlight the evident gap this 
thesis opts to fill.  
The Qatari landscape received only a handful of interest in accounting studies 
(Al-Maliki et al., 2015). However, it is worthwhile to mention studies that were done 
in the Qatari field. Firstly, there are various extant research on corporate governance 
practices in the state of Qatar which address several different fields in the subject matter 
(Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Sharar, 2011; Almudehki & Zeitun, 2012; Awadallah, 
n.d.).  Similarly, there is a considerable amount of research under the topic of disclosure 
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practices, reporting mechanisms, and adoption of IFRS in Qatar. However, none of the 
extant studies shed a light on corporate governance mechanisms as indicators to the 
level of compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements, making this thesis 
the first to address the topic.  
Hossain & Hammami (2009) empirically investigated the relationship between 
firm characteristics and voluntary disclosures in Qatar. Their sample included annual 
reports of 25 listed entities in the Doha Securities Market in 2007. By developing a 
disclosure checklist and statistically analyzing the results by multiple regression 
analysis, they found that size, age, assets in place and complexity are significant in 
explaining the levels of voluntary disclosure. 
Along the same lines, Al-Moghaiwli (2009) empirically investigated the extent 
of internet financial reporting (IFR) practices in listed entities in Qatar and the factors 
which affect these practices for the year of 2008. The study documents a significant 
relationship between profitability, company size, and ownership structure and the level 
of IFR. The author uses director and individual investor ownership to test the ownership 
structure impact on IFR in Qatar.  Although this paper is of some relevance to this 
thesis, it does not examine the impact of these characteristics on compliance with 
mandatory accounting disclosures which this study will shed a light on. Also, this paper 
took into consideration a smaller sample size of listed companies of the financial year 
of 2008 as opposed to this thesis which involves a time period of three years. 
Another study which investigated corporate governance in the light of 
ownership structures in Qatar was by Almudehki & Zeitun (2012). The authors 
examined the effects of different ownership structures on the performance of 29 non-
financial listed firms on the QSE during 2006-2011. The authors used the panel data 
regression model and linear regression model to test the influence of ownership 
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structures on company performance. They find that board, foreign, and concentrated 
ownerships have a positive and significant impact on firm performance. However, this 
thesis focuses on investigating ownership structures in the light of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures as opposed to the level of performance of the firms in 
study.  
 Awadallah (n.d.) investigated the effectiveness of several corporate governance 
practices on the audit quality of listed non-financial entities in Qatar from 2013 to 2016. 
The results indicated that managerial ownership and institutional investors have no 
significant effect on audit quality. Board independence and audit committee are 
significantly positively linked to audit quality, whereas CEO duality has a significant 
and negative link with audit quality. Although this study examined similar corporate 
governance factors selected in this thesis, it studies their impact on audit quality as 
opposed to their impact on the level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements.  
There are several studies based in the country on the topic of IFRS adoption. 
Al-Mannai & Hindi (2015) studied the extent of IFRS adoption in Qatar by the listed 
firms on the Qatar Exchange and the challenges witnessed by these entities whilst 
implementing the standards. The authors found that there are four key challenges in 
adopting IFRS in Qatar: education level, external support (external auditors and 
consultants), staff skills, and increase in judgements that could end in manipulations. 
Mardini & Almujamed (2015) initiated a study to compare segmental narrative 
disclosures under IFRS 8 of 2009 with those of IAS 14R of 2008 in Qatari listed 
companies. Other similar empirical studies under the same umbrella of disclosure 
compliance in Qatar include the study by Mardini et al. (2018) who carried out a cross 
country study to examine the degree of segmental reporting disclosures and the value 
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relevance it brings in Qatari and Jordanian listed entities in accordance with IFRS 8 
where they find that the level of information disclosed varies amongst different sectors 
and can explain share price variations. Although these three aforementioned studies 
highlight IFRS adoption in the country setting of Qatar, they differ from the current 
study. Adoption of standards does not ensure complying with them.  
 This thesis aims to investigate the compliance with IASs/IFRSs as opposed to 
their mere adoption as done so by Al-Mannai & Hindi (2015). Likewise, this thesis does 
not plan to compare between two standards but to include selected standards and 
investigate compliance with their disclosure requirements. Furthermore, this study will 
focus on Qatar rather than compare with another country in order to examine the 
particular features of Qatar and relating them to the broader objective of the thesis. 
Additionally, this thesis will highlight more IAS/IFRS items as opposed to the study by 
Mardini et al. (2018).  
Mohammadi & Mardini (2016) studied the influence of bank characteristics on  
IFRS 7 disclosures in listed Qatari banks from 2007 to 2012. The authors found the 
presence of a risk management committee and the banks size are positively associated 
with the level of IFRS 7 disclosures. Likewise, Tahat et al. (2018) explored the degree 
of financial instrument information under IAS 30, IAS 32 and IFRS 7  on a sample of 
282 listed Qatari firms between 2005 and 2012. The authors found that the disclosures 
differ amongst the firms by industry type, year, and category of information. This thesis 
does not include financial firms and does not opt to study firm characteristics with one 
IFRS standard as done by Mohammadi & Mardini (2016). Instead,  this thesis aims to 
investigate the disclosures under several selected IASs/IFRSs on listed non-financial 
entities  in the country setting of Qatar and the corporate governance factors that may 
affect them (opposed to firm characteristics) and during the time period of 2015 to 2017. 
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On a similar note, this study differs from that of Tahat et al. (2018) as it sheds a light 
on different IASs/IFRSs and studies governance characteristics such as board 
characteristics and ownership structures instead of  firm characteristics. 
Additionally, a handful of studies examined the reporting environment in Qatar 
amongst different tracks. In the field of corporate annual reports, Alattar & Al-Khater 
(2008) embarked to empirically investigate views of users of corporate annual reports 
in Qatar by distributing questionnaires to different user groups. Equally so, Al-Maliki 
et al. (2015) examined the environment of corporate financial reporting with a focus on 
investor assessment of annual reports in Qatar. Other studies which have been 
conducted under the umbrella of reporting in Qatar are associated with corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting. AlNaimi, Hossain & Momin (2011) set out to 
investigate the status and level of CSR reporting in the annual reporting of listed 
financial and manufacturing companies in Qatar for the year of 2007. The authors find 
that there is a certain extent of disclosure of human resources and product development 
related information.  
Moreover, governance was studied in Qatar but not under the realm of it as a 
factor of disclosure practices. Sharar (2011) ran a comparative analysis on corporate 
governance framework in Qatar with the 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. However, that study did not examine the governance frameworks in the 
context of a factor. Whereas this thesis opts to examine corporate governance 
mechanisms and their effects on compliance with accounting disclosures. 
To summarize the condition of the studies based in Qatar, there is a lack of 
literature on the topic of compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements. 
This lack in literature presents itself in different aspects which this study intends to 
cover. Firstly, there are little to no studies in the context of corporate governance in 
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Qatar; particularly those studying its association to compliance. Also, there is a 
considerable amount of studies on IFRS adoption, however, compliance with IFRS 
requirements remains practically untouched. Although the two studies by Mohammadi 
& Mardini (2016) and Tahat et al. (2018) took place in the country setting of Qatar and 
examined the level of compliance with IFRS items, they do not examine the factors nor 
the IAS/IFRS items this thesis opts to study. Primarily, these studies focused on 
compliance with one or a couple of IAS/IFRS items in Qatari listed firms, whereas this 
thesis sets out to examine applicable disclosures under more IFRS items. On a similar 
note, Mohammadi & Mardini (2016) examine bank characteristics, whereas this thesis 
intends to study corporate governance mechanisms as factors in non-financial listed 
firms. Also, this thesis study chose a sample between the years of 2015 – 2017, which 
are years that have not been examined in extant studies.  
Therefore, it is safe to denote that there is an eminent gap in the literature in the 
context of examining corporate governance related determinants on mandatory IFRS 
disclosure compliance in Qatar. Although Al-Shammari et al. (2008) and Boshnak 
(2017) included Qatar in their GCC wide studies, they do not cover several aspects that 
this paper will. Thus, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no study was devoted to 
study the board characteristics and ownership structure factors and the extent of 
compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements in Qatar.  
All in all, this subsection of the literature review highlighted the relevant 
empirical literature related to the topic of this thesis. Additionally, it underlined the 
evident gaps in the literature in several different aspects which will give value to the 
current study and further concrete the objectives of examining this field topic. Firstly, 
as denoted in the empirical literature review above, most of the countries conducted in 
the realm of developing countries on the topic of compliance with IFRS studied its 
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association with firm characteristics and no other corporate governance structure 
factors. Hence, this is an eminent gap in the literature which the current study of this 
thesis opts to address. Also, the previous literature which is of relevance to the topic at 
hand were all conducted in neighboring countries to Qatar which is also an obvious 
setting lacking in the literature.  On a similar note, studies that focused on the country 
setting of Qatar chose specific IASs/IFRSs to examine whereas this thesis focuses on 
highlighting mandatory items under selected IASs/IFRS. Moreover, extant studies in 
Qatar did not investigate board characteristics and ownership structures as determinants 
of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. Therefore, this 
thesis will add a unique contribution to the literature by investigating the effects of 
board characteristics and ownership structures on the extent of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements in Qatar. 
To conclude, this chapter elaborated on the topic of this paper on a conceptual 
and empirical level to shape the wholesome view of the study. The first part of the 
chapter acted as an introduction into various concepts referred to in this thesis such as 
corporate governance and its mechanisms, IAS/IFRS, and an economic overview of 
Qatar and the relevance of this topic to the country. The second part of the literature 
review chapter was an empirical review which shed a light on the various extant studies 
on compliance with disclosures, corporate governance, IAS/IFRS, reporting related 
studies in Qatar, and the eminent gap in the literature this thesis opts to tackle.  
  
 
 
 
 
  
43 
 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development  
This chapter aims to highlight the theoretical basis to heighten the rationale of the 
overall thesis topic. Moreover, it will also highlight the developed hypotheses based on 
the empirical evidence found in previous studies.  
3.1 Theoretical Framework  
The development of corporate governance on a global scale is denoted as a 
complex field for the inclusion of various aspects of cultural, legal, structural and 
ownership differences. Therefore, the extent to which a theory would be considered as 
‘relevant’ to explain the concept of corporate governance, differs from one country to 
another. Moreover, the relevance of a theory could also depend on the developmental 
stage the country is witnessing such as its economy, ownership groups, or corporate 
structures; that determine how corporate governance will develop within its particular 
setting (Mallin, 2018).  
A number of theories may be used to explain the motivation to disclose 
information and the eminent differences in the compliance levels with IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements in different companies in developing countries. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) state that entities who possess different characteristics will adopt 
different measurement and disclosure practices, which may insinuate IFRS compliance 
(Samaha & Khlif, 2016).  In addition to the characteristics of each firm, ‘regulatory 
risk’ is also assessed by managers when making decisions on the level of mandatory 
disclosures they provide which consist of reputation, financial, regulatory and litigation 
risks (Adams, 1994). Therefore, the extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements is determined by those regulatory risks tolerated by 
management and the influence set by the regulations in the market . 
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Theories that could be used in explaining the compliance levels are the agency 
theory and market-based theories. These theories have been previously used in 
literature to clarify the extent of compliance with IFRS in developing countries (e.g. 
Ahmed & Karim, 2005; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Samaha & Stapleton, 2009; Al-Akra, 
Eddie & Ali , 2010; Al Mutawaa & Hewaidy, 2010; Bova & Pereira, 2012). Therefore, 
there are several theories used in the context of this study in explaining the topic of 
corporate governance mechanisms and compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS 
disclosures. Each theory of relevance to the topic at hand is allocated to a specific group 
and explained below.  
3.1.1 Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the relationship under agency theory as: 
“a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.”(p.5) 
The agency dispute has been documented throughout history where governance 
issues arise when principals depend on agents to carry out business activities on their 
behalf (Tricker & Tricker, 2015). This theory has been used in literature about 
disclosures (Cooke,1989).  This is addressed when the principal gives the agent the 
decision-making authority whose actions do not meet the objectives of the principal. 
The interests of the principal and the agent are unaligned or separated, which imposes 
agency costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
The accounting choices and financial information disclosures by managers have 
been examined through the use of the agency theory which states that the choices made 
are to reduce agency costs and asymmetric information between insiders (agents) and 
outsiders (principals). Therefore, compliance with IAS/IFRS could be defined as an 
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entity making more disclosures and restricting accounting choices, hence agency costs 
could be used as a valid mean to clarify the company attitude toward complying with 
IFRS (Samaha & Khlif, 2016).  
This theory was the most used theory amongst compliance and disclosure 
studies in both developed and developing countries (e.g: Al-Mulhem, 1997; Naser, Al-
Khatib & Karbhari, 2002; Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Al-Shiab, 2003; Al-
Shammari et al., 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010; Rahman, Ismail & Hussin, 2011; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011; Popova, Georgakopoulos, Sotiropoulos & Konstantinos, 2013; 
Aljifri et al., 2014). 
3.1.2 Market-based Theories  
Signaling Theory  
The signaling theory by Spence (1978) explains the behavior in labor markets. 
It is perceived as an extension of the agency theory (Buskirk, 2012). However, as put 
by Morris (1987), signaling is a universal phenomenon applicable in any marketplace 
which has information asymmetry.  By using signaling, managers would signal their 
outlooks and intentions through financial statements. Thus, compliance with IFRS 
‘signals’ to the public that the entity is equipped to make more information disclosures 
and use restrictive standards.  As the case with the agency theory, many authors used 
the signaling theory in their studies in developing and developed countries (Hossain, 
Perera & Rahman, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Al-Shiab, 
2003; Leventis & Weetman, 2004; Tsalavoutas, 2011; Aljifri et al., 2014; Alfraih, 
2016). 
Capital Need Theory  
The capital need theory denotes that firms opt to raise capital in the cheapest 
manner possible (Samaha & Khlif, 2016). This theory hypothesizes that a firm’s 
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primary motivation to increase its disclosures is the need for it to raise capital (Abd-
Elsalam, 1999). Therefore, adopting IFRS highlights determined efforts by 
management to meet increased demand for information which happens when the entity 
issues more equity (Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001). Hence, compliance with mandatory 
IFRS requirements relatively increases the ease at which capital is raised (Marston & 
Shrives, 1996). Cooke (1989) gives a few reasons in support of this theory where one 
states that investors are attracted to disclosures and the fact that it decreases information 
asymmetries. In short, this theory suggests that there are several variables which could 
explain the level of compliance with IAS/IFRS. In a similar context, it is found that 
compliance with mandatory IAS disclosure requirements in Jordan has an eminent 
effect on the cost of capital (Al-Shiab, 2003). Therefore, this theory is of relevance to 
the topic of this thesis in explaining the extent of compliance with IFRS disclosure 
requirements. A number of studies based their research purpose on this theory (Abd-
Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Al-Shiab, 2003; Fekete, Matis & Lukács, 2008; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011). 
In summary, there are several theories that can be considered as the foundational 
reasoning of this study. The signaling theory is used by management to showcase their 
quality through the disclosures made by the firm. Furthermore, the agency theory posits 
that disclosure will reduce the conflict of interest between the managers and 
stakeholders by reducing information asymmetry. The agency theory in particular is 
argued to be the most prominent theory used in studies including corporate governance 
(Judge, 2012). This could be justified as corporate governance sets the instructions 
under which the agent works to be in line with the agents interests. Whereas another 
theory; the capital need theory posits that management of a firm is inclined towards 
making higher disclosures to raise capital easily in financial markets.  
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3.2 Hypotheses Development  
As formerly highlighted in the preceding subsection, most of  the extant studies 
set out to find the relationship between compliance with disclosure requirements and 
firm characteristics (such as company age and size, leverage, profitability amongst 
others) (Demir & Bahadir, 2014). Other studies did in fact study the association 
between several corporate governance factors and the extent of compliance with 
disclosures in emerging markets. Nonetheless, there is a shortage in research which 
study the link between robustness of governance mechanisms and disclosures (Ho & 
Taylor, 2013).  Corporate governance in this thesis will be studied under two categories: 
board characteristics and ownership structures.  
3.2.1 Board Characteristics  
The board of directors has been commonly described by scholars as the formal 
connecting body between the firm’s shareholders and the managers endowed with daily 
activities in the firm (Mintzberg, 1983). It is positioned at the uppermost level of any 
apposite and sound corporate governance framework. Therefore, the board plays a vital 
role in controlling the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1983). One of the board of directors 
main responsibilities is preventing any conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders (better known as the agency problem). Likewise, their elemental role is to 
guarantee the integrity of the firms accounting practices, oversee the performance of 
management, comply with laws, and warrant adequate investor returns. Therefore, it is 
safe to claim that a sound composition of board of directors would ultimately mitigate 
unfavored outcomes and conflicts of interest. There are several distinct features of 
boards that will be addressed in this thesis as discussed below: 
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 Gender Diversity 
One of the utmost important mechanisms of corporate governance control is the 
role of monitoring, particularly in country settings in which external mechanisms are 
less developed (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008).  Over the years, there have been 
several arguments on female representation on the board of directors. Dunn (2012) 
corroborates that the presence of women on the board is merely a demonstration of 
diversity and does not improve performance, per se. Bear, Rahman and Post (2010) 
states that there is a positive association between the reputation of a firm and the 
percentage of females on the board. However, other studies find that having females on 
the board translates into benefits beyond meagre diversity and reputational benefits. 
Nguyen and Faff (2007) stated that having women directors results in greater firm 
value. Only one study examined the presence of female members on the board and the 
level of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements (IAS/IFRS or local 
accounting standard requirements). Alfraih (2016) found that gender diversity was 
positively correlated with compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure by listed 
Kuwaiti firms. Nalikka (2009) found that the presence of a female CEO and female 
members on the board is of no significant impact on the levels of voluntary disclosures 
in annual reports of entities listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. To the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, there are neither set laws nor favored best practice guidelines 
indicating the encouragement or importance of having female members on the board in 
the State of Qatar. Given the mix in results from previous studies, this study assumes 
the hypothesis for this variable in the null form to confirm or disconfirm the effect of 
female members on the level of compliance. Hence, it could be argued in the context 
of Qatar that: 
H1. There is no relationship between the presence of females on the board of directors 
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and the extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. 
 Board Size 
Board size is a highly studied characteristic which has possible noteworthy 
effects on the functionality of the board (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). It is considered to 
be one of the corporate governance mechanisms which assist in the alignment of the 
interests of shareholders (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). Al-Shammari (2014) states that 
bigger boards have significant positive influence of corporate governance. 
Additionally, the size of the board could highly impact the quality of financial reports 
(Hashim & Devi, 2008). Likwise, Krismiaji and Surifah (2019) found a positive 
relationship between the boards size and the level of compliance with IFRS disclosures. 
However, other authors tend to differ with the idea that bigger boards provide greater 
advantages. Instead, Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994) highlight that when size 
and diversity in expertise increase on the board, they may not be suited for making 
strategic-decisions in a timely manner in response to critical surrounding changes. On 
a similar note, Mak and Li (2000) claim that boards that are smaller in size are expected 
to function more effectively. It has also been documented that companies with small 
boards have higher financial rations (Yermack, 1996).  On that note, Ebrahim and 
Fattah (2015) claim that large boards may have a negative effect on the board’s 
effectiveness as a result of coordination and communication issues linked to bigger 
groups.  
Associating board size as a factor influencing compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements (IAS/IFRS or local standards) has been studied in many 
previous studies on the topic. However, the results documented were mixed. Some 
studies found a significant positive influence of board size on compliance with 
mandatory IFRS disclosures such as Barako et al. (2006), Al-Akra et al (2010) and 
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Alfraih (2016). Al-Sartawi, Alrawahi and Sanad (2016) found a significant and negative 
relationship between board size and compliance with IAS 1 disclosures in Bahrain. 
Hassaan (2013a), Hassaan (2013b), and Juhmani (2017) found no significant 
association between board size and compliance with IFRS disclosures in Jordan, Egypt, 
and Bahrain, respectively. Similarly, Ebrahim and Fattah (2015) found no significant 
association between board size and compliance with IAS 12 requirements in Egypt. 
In the context of Qatar, Article (95) of law No. 11 of 2015: ‘Promulgating the 
Commercial Companies law’ states that the composition of the elected board of a 
shareholding company should consist of no less than five members and shall not exceed 
eleven. Since the article states the acceptable number of members and does not stress 
on a larger board size, in addition to the mixed results from previous studies, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H2: There is no relationship between the board of directors’ size and the extent of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. 
 CEO Duality  
Duality occurs when the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the same 
individual (Ujunwa, 2012). Combining the two roles would result in the lack of decision 
control and management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to Forker (1992), role 
duality is one of the corporate governance factors which is a matter of concern as it 
allows for the presence of the dominant personality which has been linked to poor 
disclosure practices. Equally, Ho and Wong (2001) set forth an argument which denotes 
that the combination of these roles would surely lead to the individual withholding 
negative information from outsiders. Additionally, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) state that 
when the Chairman and CEO positions are by one individual, the boards governing will 
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be compromised because the person would select board members, agenda items, as well 
as be in control of board meetings.  
The agency theory calls for the separation of these roles in order to ensure a 
proper check and balance system on managements performance (Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002). The separation of the roles of the CEO and Chairperson would aid in improving 
the quality of monitoring and minimizing obtained from retaining information, thus 
enhancing reporting quality (Forker, 1992).  Furthermore, Holtz and Neto (2014) found 
that the informativeness of reporting information is associated with the separation of 
the Chairman/CEO role. 
Studies by Ebrahim & Fattah (2015) and Alfraih (2016) note a significant 
negative association between CEO duality and compliance with mandatory IFRS 
disclosures; indicating that compliance is higher when there is no duality. Similarly, 
Juhmani (2017) records a negative association between CEO duality and compliance 
with IFRS disclosures in Bahrain. Rahman et al. (2011) found no significant 
relationship between CEO duality and compliance with mandatory MASB disclosures. 
Likewise, Hassaan (2013a) states that there are no differences that are statistically 
significant in the extent of compliance with IFRS disclosures in companies whom 
separate roles of the chairperson and CEO and those who do not.  
International and local codes support the separation of these top roles; to 
concrete the existence of a proper ‘check and balance’ system. This is eminent in the 
Cadbury Report of 1992, QSE and QFMA rulebooks (QSE, 2015; QFMA 2017). 
Article (7) ‘Prohibition of Combining Positions’ in the Governance Code for companies 
by the QFMA states that it is prohibited for the position of the Chairman to be combined 
with any executive position in the firm (QFMA, 2017). However, the state of Qatar 
follows a ‘comply or explain’ approach (Shehata, 2015); consequently should a listed 
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entity have a case of role duality, it would report it.  Although CEO role duality is likely 
to be uncommon in Qatar, it would be worthy to examine this possibility. Therefore, in 
the context of Qatar, it is hypothesized that: 
H3: There is no relationship between CEO duality and the extent of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements.  
 Founding Family Members on the Board 
A family firm is considered so if one of its original founders or descendants 
maintain their positions in management, the board, or among the largest shareholder 
group (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Wang, 2006; Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015). Burkart, 
Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) claim that it is dominant across publicly traded companies 
worldwide to have family ownership and control. Hence, the main characteristic is the 
existence of one or more controlling family and their involvement in managerial aspects 
of the firm (Floros, Spanos, Tsipouri & Xanthakis, 2008). The main attribute found 
amongst family firms is that the family is involved in the process of major decision 
making (Mellin & Nordqvist, 2000).  Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) state that family ownership is found to be common in developing countries. The 
common perception arguing in favor of family firms is the notion of minimized agency 
costs as a result of ownership and management being the same person or persons from 
the same family (Floros et al., 2008). Al-Shammari (2014) further states that it is likely 
in family owned firms for members of the family to have positions as executive and 
non-executive directors.  
Alanezi & Albuloushi (2011) as well as Ebrahim and Fattah (2015) identify a 
significant positive association between founding family members on the board and 
compliance with disclosures. Ho and Wong (2001) found that the existence of family 
members on the board is negatively related to the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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Abdullah et al. (2015) and Alfraih (2016) found a significant negative correlation 
between the percentage of family members and disclosures. This result is in line with 
findings by Mohamed and Sulong (2010) who state that entities with a larger number 
of family members have poorer disclosures on their annual reports.  
Furthermore, in the context of Qatar, there is no legislation restricting or 
highlighting the number of family members on the board in firms. Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino & Buchholtz (2001) claim that family associations to businesses lead to agency 
problems in relation to management additionally challenging to resolve because of 
altruism. Particularly, firms with a high number of family members are doubtfully to 
comply with requirements pertaining to corporate governance and their board are less 
keen on complying with mandatory disclosures as opposed to firms not run by families 
(Abdullah et al., 2015). Likewise, Boshnak (2017) states that family members on the 
board have more access to information on the company and have no intentions in 
disclosing it to the public; leading to lower disclosures. Therefore, in order to confirm 
or disconfirm the possibility of a founding family member on the board exerting 
influence on the extent of disclosures, it could be hypothesized that:  
H4: There is no relationship between the presence of founding family members on the 
board and the extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements.  
Non-executive Directors  
One of the traditional mechanisms of good corporate governance is the number 
of non-executive directors present on the board (Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015). This 
characteristic is universally accepted as a necessary corporate characteristic (Juhmani, 
2017). It is often argued that boards characterized with a higher percentage of non-
executive directors are anticipated to be more effective in their function of monitoring 
and encouraging increased levels of transparency (Gul & Leung, 2004). Therefore, non-
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executive board members play a vital role in overseeing the behavior of  management 
and limiting managerial opportunism (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Ebrhaim & Fattah, 2015). 
As depicted by the agency theory, these board members can reduce information 
asymmetry  (Porta et al., 2002; Allegrini & Greco, 2013). Furthermore, Mangel and 
Singh (1993) deem that non-executive members of the board enjoy more opportunity 
for control, whereby Haniffa and Cooke (2002) refer to non-executive directors as the 
‘check and balance mechanism’, which enhances the effectiveness of the board and as 
advisors who ought to increase the disclosure quality of the firm. Although the literature 
stresses on the importance of non-executive directors on the board, previous studies 
yielded mixed results on the effect of the proportion of non-executive directors on 
financial disclosures.  
Forker (1992) documented that an increase in the proportion of non-executive 
directors results in financial disclosures of higher quality. Likewise, other studies 
indicate that firms with a higher number of non-executive directors are less likely to 
have financial statement fraud (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Ajinkya et al.,2005). On the other 
hand, Ebrahim and Fattah (2015) found that there is no support to prove a significant 
effect of non-executive directors on the initial compliance with IFRS.  On a similar 
note, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) indicate an insignificant negative relation with 
voluntary disclosures made in Malaysia. Aljifri et al., (2014) depict that outside 
directors have a positive but insignificant correlation to the extent of disclosure. Eng 
and Mak (2003) found a significant negative effect of non-executive directors on 
voluntary disclosure in Singapore. Other studies found no impact of the number of non-
executive directors on the extent of mandatory disclosure (Hassaan, 2013b; Aljifri et 
al., 2014).  
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The QFMA governance code defines a non-executive director as ‘A Board 
member who does not have a full-time management position at the Company or who 
does not receive a wage’ (QFMA, 2017, p.12). Although these members are highlighted 
in the governance code of the country, the contribution of their presence on the board 
yielded mixed empirical results in extant studies. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that: 
H5: There is no relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and the 
extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. 
Cross-directorships (Multiple Directorships) 
In a period in which corporate governance is increasingly scrutinized, a 
considerable number of debates highlighted the effectiveness of the boards monitoring 
role in publicly traded firms. A noteworthy factor of that debate was centered around 
the question of whether directors should serve on numerous boards or be obligated to 
do so (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006).  The phenomenon of interlocking boards is when an 
individual sits on the board of two or more firms; forming a link between them (Fich & 
White, 2005). 
The proper functionality of the board of directors is not only exclusively and 
merely dependent on its independence from managers and its composition. The time 
availability of board directors is of equal importance (Guerra & Santos, 2011). As 
indicated in the prior sections of this thesis, one of the boards main activities is 
monitoring or overseeing the overall activities of the managers in the company, which 
they should be able to do should they have the time factor. Likewise, one of the multiple 
factors considered to impact the effectiveness of the monitoring role of the board is 
multiple or cross directorships (Campbell & Mingues-Vera, 2008). Therefore, studying 
the effect of busy boards (also referred to in this thesis as interlocking directorates, busy 
directors, multiple directorships or cross directorships) should be of interesting essence 
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to this thesis.  
Interlocking directorates have received attention in various different studies 
(e.g. Fich & White, 2005; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Guerra & Santos, 2011). The 
outcome of directors sitting on multiple boards could be argued to be a positive one as 
it allows for sharing experience and bringing in new resources. Therefore, arguments 
revolving cross-directorships are based on the resource dependence theory (Davis, 
1996).  It is asserted that CEO’s interlocking on different boards is desired as a result 
of their experience and credibility as peers (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989). Dahya, Lonie 
and Power (1996) favor interlocking boards as they would offer insights from personal 
knowledge of other firms. Additionally, it influences the members’ independence and 
ushers a competitive disadvantage (Davis, 1993). On the other hand, by having a 
presence on several boards, those members may be confronted with scarcity of time 
where they might find themselves to be too busy to perform their roles sufficiently 
(Guerra & Santos, 2011). Likewise, it is argued that busy directors are more likely to 
be absent from board meetings (Jiraporn, Davidson, Ning & DaDalt, 2008). 
Additionally, a recurrent viewpoint amid policy advocates and investors is that 
attending several boards may lead to overloaded directors whom will not be effective 
monitors of the management (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). Guerra and Santos (2011) find 
that busy directors are less independent, less active, less relevant to firms, and less 
inclined to monitor and evaluate executive’s activities in the company; which may lead 
their companies to the exposure to unpredictable risks.  
The different arguments pertaining to multiple directorships have been 
previously studied in relation to disclosures. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) denote that 
cross-directorships by board members have noteworthy inferences on disclosure 
practices. Similarly, Alfraih (2016) found a significant positive association between this 
  
57 
 
factor and the extent of compliance with disclosures.  
Qatar imposes laws on the acceptable number of boards directors may sit on 
simultaneously. The Commercial Companies Law 11 of 2015 states that members of 
the board are limited to be on no more than two listed QSE entities. According to Article 
(7) “Prohibition of Combining Positions’  in the QFMA governance rulebook, “it is 
prohibited for any person to be a board member for more than three shareholding 
companies which their headquarters located in the State” (QFMA, 2017, p.20). 
Therefore, this raises the interest for this thesis to investigate the possibility of multiple 
directorships benefiting or costing companies in relation to compliance with IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements. Busy boards may be considered inactive, dependent and lack 
proper monitoring of top management and the company’s performance. Hence, they 
would less likely have the time to actively monitor the compliance with IAS/IFRS. 
However, multiple directorships have also been considered to benefit companies in 
terms of sharing insights of other firms. Based on the varying viewpoints contributed 
by extant studies in the abovementioned arguments, this thesis hypothesizes that: 
H6: There is no relationship between the involvement of a board member in other listed 
entities in Qatar and the extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements. 
3.2.2 Ownership Structures 
A vital contextual element in GCC countries in association with corporate 
governance is the firm’s ownership structure (Baydoun, Maguire, Ryan & Willet, 
2013). Ownership structures and conflicts of interests have molded discussions on 
corporate governance (Cunha & Piccoli, 2017). The type and diffusion of equity owners 
have long been suggested as significant variables in explaining levels of disclosure 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). The factor of ownership is relevant in explaining levels of 
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transparency as when ownership is greatly concentrated, the demand for information is 
less (Arcay & Vázquez, 2005).  Denis and McConnell (2003) imply that ownership 
structures revolves around the size and the identities of ownership of stockholders. 
Thus, ownership structures of listed entities may have an influence on the quality and 
extent of the entities disclosure practices (Eng & Mak, 2003). Also, entities with 
diffused ownerships lead to an increase in agency costs (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1996). Hence, managers of companies may increase disclosures for owners to monitor 
their interests; as a mean to reduce agency costs (Al-Akra et al., 2010).  
To elaborate, disclosures are likely to be greater in companies with diffused 
ownerships because it acts as a monitoring tool for the owners to oversee management 
behavior as denoted by the agency theory (Leftwich, Watts & Zimmerman, 1981; 
McKinnon & Dalimunthe, 1993; Raffournier, 1995; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  Prior 
studies appear to have poured an adequate level of attention and empirically studied the 
significant relationship of ownership structures alongside the effectiveness of corporate 
governance (Gray, Meek & Roberts, 1995; Dwivedi & Jain, 2005; Krivogorsky, 2006). 
Several studies shed light on ownership structures as determinants of the extent of 
compliance with disclosures (e.g. Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Naser et al., 2002;  Eng & Mak, 
2003; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Al-Shammari et al., 
2008; Al-Akra et al, 2010; Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011; Hassaan 2013a; 2013b).  
As previously stated, although there are a number of studies which set out to 
examine factors of ownership structures as determinants of mandatory compliance 
(including mandatory IFRS disclosure compliance), are quite absent as opposed to 
those which studied corporate characteristics with the level of compliance with 
disclosure requirements. Consequently, this thesis opts to study the ownership structure 
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variables below as determinants of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements.  
Institutional Ownership  
Major holders of equity whose decisions to buy or sell can affect disclosure 
policies of management and share prices are institutional investors (El-Gazzar, 1998). 
Their hefty stakes in firms allow them to be considered as the most important in 
corporate governance structures (Soliman, Ragab & Eldin, 2014). Additionally, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that institutional investors have a greater ability in 
monitoring behavior of management than scattered investors. Healy, Hutton and Palepu 
(1999) claim that institutional ownership has a positive relation to the level of corporate 
disclosures as a result of increased demand and pressure from those institutional 
investors.  
This thesis chose to explain this variable through the agency theory, the 
signaling theory as well as the capital need theory for the purposes of securing this 
variable on theoretical grounds. In order to receive funding, entities would opt to 
disclose as much information as possible for the purposes of transparency and to reduce 
the chances of the agency problem. Likewise, the signaling theory describes the use of 
disclosures to disseminate certain company news or disclosures to attract further 
investment. As argued by Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), countries where the primary 
source of funds for companies come from financial institutions, will disclose increased 
information on their reports. This disclosure of detailed information enhances the 
possibility of receiving funds from financial institutions (Juhmani, 2013). Also, Healy 
and Palepu (2001) denote that these investors are rigorous about the timing and quality 
of the information demanded. Hence, it is safe to denote that the capital need theory 
can also be applied to those other institutional investors and the use of this thesis.  
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Ebrahim & Fattah (2015) found that institutional ownership is significantly and 
positively associated with the compliance with IAS 12 disclosures made by Egyptian 
listed companies in 2007. Boshnak (2017) record a negative impact of institutional 
ownership on the level of disclosure. Others document no impact of institutional 
ownership on disclosure (Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010). Given the 
eminent mixed results contributed by extant studies, it is hypothesized that:  
H7: There is no relationship between institutional ownership and the extent of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. 
Government Ownership  
It is argued that entities which are controlled by a dominant government 
ownership may disclose more information to mirror the countries commitment to be 
transparent (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). The government could act as a factor of 
influence on the practices of financial reporting through regulators, where the regulator 
influences financial reporting practices to serve the needs of the government in terms 
of economic development and political stability (Cooke, 1990). This was further 
concreted by the study of Li and Harrison (2008) who denote that the board of directors 
will appear responsible and legitimate to the public once they make more disclosures. 
However, the results on the association between the level of disclosures made and 
government ownership are mixed. Eng and Mak (2003), Abd-Elsalam & Weetman 
(2007), and Boshnak (2017)  found that government ownership has a positive impact 
on mandatory disclosure. Likewise, Naser and Al-Khatib (2000) document a significant 
positive impact of government ownership on corporate disclosure. However, Naser et 
al. (2002) and Hassaan (2013b) found that there is no impact on mandatory disclosure; 
having no association between government ownership and the level of disclosure. 
Likewise, in their study in Malaysia, Ghazali & Weetman (2006) found that 
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government ownership does not encourage higher disclosure and better transparency. 
Likewise, Juhmani (2017) finds no impact of government ownership on compliance 
levels in Bahrain. As a result of the inconsistency of results, the null hypothesis for this 
variable reads: 
H8: There is no relationship between government ownership and the extent of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. 
Foreign Ownership 
Hassan (2015) argues that from a ‘power’ standpoint, increases in foreign 
investment could urge firms to provide more information. Boubakri, Cosset and 
Guedhami (2005) state that foreign investors call for higher disclosure standards and  
preserve an effective monitoring of management. This may be because, as put by Naser 
et al. (2002), foreign investors are highly likely to request higher standards of disclosure 
as a result of being more experienced in international and regional markets. Also, they 
are more apt to invest in entities that disclose more information (Mangena & 
Tauringana, 2007). Likewise, it is also argued that demand for information is higher by 
foreign investors given the geographical separation between owners and managers 
(Craswell & Taylor, 1992). Similarly, it is often contended that foreign ownership could 
enhance an entity’s practices in corporate reporting (Lambert, Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2007). Moreover, foreigners are willing to invest in countries whose companies adhere 
to exceptional disclosure practices.  
The theory used to support this hypothesis is the capital need theory as Cooke 
(1989) states that investors are attracted to disclosures and the fact that it decreases 
information asymmetries. Also, the agency theory states that firms with a higher level 
of outsider ownership are inclined to share more information than those with closed 
ownership structures (Boshnak, 2017). Bearing in mind Qatar’s efforts to attract foreign 
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investments to the country by implementing investor reports laws alongside new 
reinstated laws to allow for foreign ownership, it would be of high interest to examine 
whether the adoption of and compliance with internationally renowned disclosure 
requirements does in fact come as a result of foreign ownership.  In Qatar, Almudehki 
and Zeitun (2012) found a positive impact of foreign ownership on firm performance. 
Likewise, Alhazaimeh et al. (2013) found a significant positive association between 
foreign ownership and disclosure. Previous studies evinced mixed results on the matter. 
Hassan (2015) found an insignificant association between foreign ownership and 
corporate disclosures. Naser et al. (2002), Crowley (2011), and Aljifri et al. (2014) 
document no impact of foreign ownership on mandatory disclosures. Extant studies that 
examined the association of foreign ownership and the level of compliance with 
disclosures yielded mixed results, therefore:   
H9: There is no relationship between foreign ownership and the extent of compliance 
with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. 
 
To conclude, this chapter shed a light on the several theories this study is based 
on such as the agency theory, capital need theory, and the signaling theory. This chapter 
continues by developing the hypotheses for this study based on the empirical evidence.   
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
This chapter sets out to highlight the methods used to accomplish the empirical 
testing of the topic at hand. It highlights the data collection method for various variables 
and the sources used. First, the sample selection and time period selection is explained 
and justified. Next, the process of data collection for the independent variables is 
discussed for board characteristics and ownership structure variables as well as the 
control variables. After that, the data collection for the dependent variable and the steps 
of constructing its index is cited in its completeness alongside the two different scoring 
methods used to reach the final compliance score. Finally, this chapter ends with an 
illustration of the two models that will be used in this paper.  
The objectives of this research are concomitant with disclosure practices in 
general and IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosure practices in listed Qatari entities in 
particular. To accomplish the set objectives, this thesis examines several corporate 
governance factors in the realm of ownership structures and board characteristics and 
how influential they are on the level of compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure 
requirements in Qatar. Hence, this thesis uses a quantitative research design to 
accomplish the objectives.   
The data for this thesis was gathered from multiple sources. Information needed 
for the independent variables of board characteristics and control variables were 
collected from company annual reports and yearly corporate governance reports. Data 
gathered for the independent variables relating to ownership structures was obtained 
from Bloomberg Terminal. Furthermore, data used to construct the index for mandatory 
IFRS disclosure requirements was obtained from the KPMG ‘IFRS Guide to Annual 
Financial Statements – Disclosure Checklist’ for the years of 2015, 2016, and 2017. 
These will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sub-sections. 
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4.1 Time Period and Sample selection 
This thesis is longitudinal in its kind where it will focus on the fiscal years of 
2015, 2016, and 2017 with a total sample size of 72 annual reports of listed non-
financial entities. There are several reasons for this selection. Firstly, the number of 
listed entities of one year on the QSE is low; given the fact that this thesis will exclude 
all financial and insurance listed entities. Therefore, three consecutive years were 
chosen in order for this study to have an acceptable sample size that would revert 
reliable results. Moreover, this thesis would add to the small number of studies which 
embarked on studying the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosures over a 
couple of years such as: Yeoh (2005), Al-Shammari et al., (2008), Al-Akra et al. (2010), 
Agyei-Mensah (2017), and Boshnak (2017). Also, these years were not covered by 
studies on disclosure compliance in Qatar which heightens the interest to examine this 
over a few years. Other reasons pertaining to the choice of these years are that the IFRS 
disclosure rules had minor changes during the course of these three years; adding 
consistency to the index that will be developed. In reference to Silvia (2019), minor 
changes issued in IASs/IFRSs over the years of 2015 to 2017 had an effective date after 
the time period selected to be studied in this thesis. Also, the region lives in an ongoing 
case of diplomatic unrest as Qatar witnessed an embargo in the middle of 2017; 
amplifying interest to examine the compliance with disclosures and the reporting 
environment.  
The selected companies for this thesis were selected from the original site of the 
Qatar Stock Exchange. There were 43, 44 and 45 listed entities on the QSE across 7 
different industry classifications in the years of 2015, 2016, and 2017; respectively. 
Annual reports of entities initially listed in the years of 2016 and 2017 were removed 
in order to maintain consistency amongst the sample to 129 annual reports. In order to 
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decrease chances of bias and to maintain coherence, this study excluded listed financial 
and insurance companies from the sample as they adhere to different disclosure rules 
and their transactions are not of equivalency to those of non-financial entities (Alfraih, 
2016). This is consistent with previous similar studies (eg: Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Tsalavoutas, André & Evans, 2012; Alfraih, 2016). Therefore, a total of 51 annual 
reports of listed entities under the classifications of ‘Banks & Financial services’ and 
‘Insurance’ over the years of 2015, 2016, and 2017 were excluded from the study 
bringing the sample to a total set of 78 non-financial listed entities.  However, after 
thorough scrutiny of the data collected, it was apparent that there was no information 
on the ownership structure variables for two companies across all three years. 
Therefore, these companies were also excluded from the sample; resulting in a sample 
of 72 annual reports (24 listed entities for each year).  
The industrial classifications of the firms included in this thesis are based on 
their classification on the original site of the QSE. The sectors of the studies included 
in this thesis are: Consumer Goods & Services, Industrials, Real Estate, Telecoms, and 
Transportation. The final sample selected based on industrial classifications is shown 
in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1. Breakdown by Industrial Classifications of Listed Non-financial Entities 
Industrial Classification Total Number 
of Companies/ 
year 
Total Sample 
size over 3 
years 
(%) 
Consumer Goods & Services 7 21 29 
Industrials 8 24 33 
Real Estate 4 12 17 
Telecoms 2 6 8 
Transportation  3 9 13 
Total 24 72 100  
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4.2 The Independent Variables: Board of Directors Characteristics and 
Ownership Structures 
There are nine independent variables in this study classified under two different 
corporate governance factors: board characteristics and ownership structures. The first 
corporate governance factor examined in this thesis is the characteristics or structures 
of boards. This thesis opts to study this in the light of six different variables constituting 
board characteristics, namely: board size, presence of female members on the board, 
CEO duality, non-executive directors, members of the founding family on board, and 
cross-directorships. The data collected for these variables were taken from company 
annual reports or corporate governance reports available on each company’s respective 
website.  
The second corporate governance factor studied in this thesis was ownership 
structures, specifically: government, institutional, and foreign ownership. Data for 
these variables were collected from Bloomberg Terminal for several reasons. Firstly,  
ownership classification information in company annual reports were little to none. 
Additionally, a majority of corporate governance reports of companies did not disclose 
ownership information. Therefore, governance reports as an option of a source were 
dismissed as (1) most of the companies do not have that information disclosed, and (2) 
it would be irrational to remove half the sample for unavailability of ownership 
structure information from one source whist keeping those companies of which 
ownership structure information is available. Thus, the researcher resolved to using 
Bloomberg Terminal as a source of ownership structure information for each fiscal year 
included in this study.  
Data derived from the terminal was clear except for the data pertaining to the 
variable of foreign ownership. The percentages taken for this variable were extracted 
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from the Bloomberg classification based on geographic locations where all country 
ownership percentages (except Qatar) were added together. The information derived 
from the terminal was further filtered by the researcher in an effort to control the 
chances of biased results. This was done by filtering percentages listed under the 
geographic setting of ‘unknown’ found under ‘geographic classification’ as it may have 
been referring to the State of Qatar.  
In addition to the abovementioned independent variables, several control 
variables were taken into consideration in this study for their eminent influence on the 
dependent variable studied as depicted in other studies.  
3.2 Control Variables  
As previously mentioned, countless studies set out to study the association or 
influence several firm characteristics may have on the level of mandatory disclosures 
(generally and mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures). The results of the studies documented 
mixed results on whether certain characteristics have an impact on compliance with 
disclosure requirements. In line with previous studies on the compliance with 
mandatory IFRS disclosures by Hassaan (2013a; 2013b), Alfraih (2016), Al-Sartawi et 
al. (2016), this thesis will use certain control variables. 
4.2.1 Firm size   
Previous studies reported that firm size is the utmost influential characteristic in 
explaining practices associated with mandatory disclosures (e.g: Galani et al., 2011; 
Aljifri et al., 2014). Al-Shammari et al. (2008) set forth that companies that are greater 
in size possess more resources and thus spend more on compliance and are less possible 
to be affected by information disclosure than small firms. In other words, firm size is 
considered a sign of economies of scale (Hassan, 2015).  Several studies found that firm 
size is positively related to the level of a company’s compliance with mandatory 
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disclosures or disclosures in general (e.g. Wallace & Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Naser et al., 2002; Al-Shiab, 2003; Eng & Mak, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Al-Ulis, 
2006; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Fekete et al., 2008; Al Mutawaa & Hewaidy, 2010; 
Galani et al., 2011; Agyei-Mensah,2013; Mardini et al., 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; 
Rahman & Hamdan, 2019). In Qatar, Al-Moghaiwli (2009) documents a significant 
positive association between firm size and IFR; as did Hossain and Hammami (2009) 
on voluntary disclosures. In line with the studies of Glaum and Street (2003) Hassaan 
(2013a), Hassaan (2013b), Alfraih (2016), and Al-Sartawi et al. (2016) firm size will 
be used in this thesis as a control variable and will be calculated by taking the natural 
logarithm of total assets to control for the size effect in line with Alfraih (2016). 
4.2.2 Liquidity 
Prior studies recorded mixed results on liquidity where Al-Akra et al. (2010) 
found a positive association between liquidity and disclosures. However, Wallace and 
Naser (1995), Naser and Al-Khatib (2000), and Naser et al. (2002), found a negative 
association between the variables. Wallace and Naser (1995) and Agyei-Mensah (2013) 
found no impact of liquidity on mandatory disclosure. Hence, as claimed by Hassaan 
(2013a), identifying the relationship between liquidity and levels of compliance is 
unpredictable. Therefore, company liquidity shall be a control variable in this thesis, in 
accordance with studies of Hassaan (2013a) and  Alfraih (2016).  
4.2.3 Profitability  
As the case with liquidity, results documented by prior studies on the influence 
of profitability on disclosures are mixed (Hassaan, 2013a). In Qatar, Al-Moghaiwli 
(2009) documents a significant positive association between profitability and IFR. Most 
studies found a positive effect of profitability on compliance with mandatory 
disclosures (Naser & Al-Khatib, 2000; Naser et al., 2002; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Al-
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Shammari et al., 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010; Yiadom & Atsunyo, 2014; Alrawahi & 
Sarea, 2016). On the other hand, Wallace and Naser (1995) report a negative impact of 
profitability on disclosures. In harmony with previous studies of Glaum and Street 
(2003), Hassaan (2013a), Alfraih (2016), and Al-Sartawi et al. (2016), profitability will 
be considered as a control variable. 
4.2.4 Firm age 
Studies in developing countries found a positive association of frim age with 
compliance level with mandatory disclosure. Alrawahi and Sarea (2016) argue that 
large companies may be older than smaller firms and hence find compliance less costly 
as a result of their conventional reporting systems. Furthermore, Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007) state that  it is often perceived a proxy for risk. Therefore, firms that 
are older as opposed to younger firms are anticipated to disclose more information in 
their annual reports (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Glaum & Street, 2003; Alfaraih, 2009). 
Several previous study found that firm age is positively associated with the extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). In the context of Qatar, 
Hossain and Hammami (2009) found a positive association between the age of the firm 
and the level of voluntary disclosures. Others found no impact on the extent of 
disclosures (Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011). This thesis will measure firm age by the 
amount of years since listing in line with studies by Alfraih (2016), Al-Sartawi et al. 
(2016) and Boshnak (2017). 
4.2.5 Auditor type  
Previous studies conducted in the realm of disclosure compliance recorded 
various results pertaining to the correlation between the type of external auditor and 
compliance with disclosure requirements. Street and Gray (2002), Glaum and Street 
(2003), Santos et al. (2013) indicate a positive relationship between the levels of 
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compliance with IAS disclosure requirements and being audited by one of the Big 4 
audit firms. Rahman et al. ( 2011) found no significant influence of this variable on 
compliance with MASB accounting standards. Likewise, Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan 
(2010) found no significant relationship between auditor type and voluntary disclosure. 
Al-Akra et al. (2010) state that there is a significant association between auditor type 
and compliance with IFRS disclosures. Alrawahi and Sarea (2016) state that there is a 
positive association between auditor type and compliance with mandatory IAS 1 
requirements. In the same vein, Mardini et al., (2013) and Yiadom and Atsunyo (2014) 
found auditor type to have a positive influence on IFRS compliance. Based on mixed 
evidence by prior research, the type of auditor will be considered a control variable in 
line with studies by Hassaan (2013a), Hassaan (2013b) and Al-Sartawi (2016).  
Other control variables which were not included in this thesis were industry type 
and years. The reason for omitting these two variables as controls are based on several 
reasons.  Firstly, this thesis excludes all listed financial and insurance firms as they 
would naturally have their own set of accounting disclosure to adhere to. This limits 
bias in the thesis since most of the other non-financial entities follow the same 
disclosure practices. Likewise, although this thesis included a sample from the years of 
2015, 2016, and 2017, results of the mandatory disclosure index under both scoring 
methods used did not raise concerns of any discrepancies between those years’ results 
(see chapter 5, section 5.1).  
4.3 The Dependent Variable: Mandatory disclosure index  
4.3.1 Index construction & IAS/IFRS selection 
Marston & Shrives (1991) state that a reliable measurement tactic for corporate 
compliance is a properly-constructed compliance index. To achieve the objectives of 
this thesis, the level of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures is measured by a 
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self-constructed index in line with many previous studies on mandatory IFRS 
disclosures  (Cooke, 1992; Tower et al., 1999; Street & Gray, 2002; Al-Shammari et 
al., 2008; Alfaraih, 2009; Aljifri et al., 2014, Alfraih, 2016). The reference documents 
used to construct the index were the KPMG ‘IFRS Guide to Annual Financial 
Statements – Disclosure Checklist’ for the years of 2015, 2016, and 2017 (KPMG, 
2015, 2016, 2017). 
The mandatory disclosure index (INDEX) was constructed by undergoing 
several steps. Based on the reference document, there are 45 effective IAS/IFRS 
standards. However, only 12 were chosen for the purpose of this thesis and 33 were 
excluded for their inapplicability to the Qatari reporting environment or for the sample 
of companies highlighted in this study. Also, any minor changes to IASs/IFRSs issued 
over the years of 2015, 2016, and 2017 had an effective date after the years studied in 
this thesis. Hence, these items were also excluded. Furthermore, other standards were 
removed from this thesis based on judgement and thorough checks by auditors from the 
Big 4.  
The choice of the IASs/IFRSs in the self-constructed index was tailored to fit 
the unique country setting of Qatar and its applicability to the non-financial sector. This 
is in line with the methods taken by previous studies with topics on similar grounds, 
i.e.: interest to study the level of compliance with mandatory disclosure items (e.g. 
Alfraih, 2016; Boshnak, 2017).  Therefore, in line with the previous study by Boshnak 
(2017), the selection of IFRS standards for the mandatory disclosure index is based on 
the following criteria: 
1. Relevance of the IFRS and its associated disclosure items to the country setting 
of Qatar for the years ended 2015, 2016, and 2017; 
2. Relevance of the IFRS and its items to the listed entities chosen for this thesis; 
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3. Relevance to the objectives/motives of this thesis.  
The chosen 12 IAS/IFRS standards were adequately inspected for their items 
characterized as mandatory disclosure requirements. Other items that fell under each 
standard which were simply defined as suggested, encouraged or voluntary, were 
excluded from the disclosure index. Thus, the disclosure requirements of the standards 
were combined to create a self-constructed comprehensive index comprising a checklist 
of 216 mandatory disclosure items, which are obligated to be followed for the financial 
years included in this study.   
However, since the standards and their items chosen for the index of this thesis 
were picked on the basis of their relevancy and applicability to Qatar and the sample, 
an element of subjectivity was involved. Also, there is a possible issue of duplication 
where there is a probable chance of including an item more than once in the disclosure 
index should it be required under other standards as well (Vlachos, 2001; Tsalavoutas 
& Evans, 2010).   
Nonetheless, in order to ensure validity and limit extreme subjectivity as well 
as duplication in the selection of the chosen standards and their disclosure items in the 
mandatory index, several steps were taken to reach a conclusion on including them in 
order to achieve the objectives and motives of this thesis: 
1. IFRS implementation related studies conducted in countries in the Middle East 
(and the GCC in particular) were examined in order to determine which items 
are relevant and used in the accounting environment of listed entities in the 
region, in line with Boshnak (2017); 
2. Confirming that the chosen standards are in fact disclosed in several annual 
reports of the listed entities chosen for this study across several years. Similarly, 
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those IFRS not added to this study were also searched in annual reports to 
confirm their inapplicability in Qatar or the listed entities chosen for this study; 
3. Discussion with two IFRS professionals from KPMG to assure the IASs/IFRSs 
and their associated disclosure requirements are relevant to the objectives of 
thesis and to the sample chosen and that they constitute as disclosure items. 
This is in line with steps undertaken and advised by previous studies by 
Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010), Abdullah et al. (2015), Boshnak (2017). 
The selected IASs/IFRSs included in the disclosure index of this thesis are 
highlighted in Table 2 Excluded items along with explanatory reasons for their 
omission are in Appendix A . As illustrated in Table 2, the IAS/IFRS standard with 
the least number of mandatory requirements is IAS 23: ‘Borrowing Costs’ in 
comparison to IAS 1: ‘Presentation of Financial Statements’, which ultimately 
holds the highest number of mandatory disclosure requirements.  
 
 
Table 2. Number of Selected IASs/IFRSs and Mandatory Disclosure Items 
 
Standard Title # of items 
used 
# of items 
not used 
IAS 1  Presentation of Financial Statements  56 43 
IAS 2  Inventories 7 1 
IAS 7  Cash-Flow Statements  28 14 
IAS 16  Property, Plant, and Equipment  19 4 
IAS 18  Revenue  6 0 
IAS 21  Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates  4 6 
IAS 23  Borrowing Costs  2 0 
IAS 24  Related Party Disclosures  28 13 
IAS 33  Earnings Per Share  4 6 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 16 11 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities, and 
Contingent Assets 
10 2 
IFRS 8  Operating Segments  36 5 
Total  12 IAS/IFRS 216 105 
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4.4 Scoring and Weighting the Index  
4.4.1 Measurement Instruments of Compliance: The Dichotomous Approach vs 
Partial Compliance Approach 
The chosen items (included in the index) can be weighted to mirror their 
importance to the researcher or the focus group (Vlachos, 2001). This thesis 
investigates the level of compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements. 
Mandatory disclosures yield necessary information for all users of financial statements 
and thus each mandatory disclosure is considered to have equal importance to the users 
(Boshnak, 2017). Hence, there is no need to assign weights to different items in the case 
of this thesis and the objectives it opts to achieve. This is because weighting items 
would highly depend on exercising subjective judgement in relation to the importance 
of an item (Vlachos, 2001). In line with the objectives of this thesis and the fact that it 
opts to study mandatory disclosure items, the researcher chose to use the unweighted 
procedure in line with previous studies which studied mandatory disclosures  (Rahman 
et al., 2011; Boshnak, 2017). In line with similar studies undertaken in developed 
countries such as Tower et al. (1999), Street and Bryant (2000) and in developing 
countries: Al-Shammari et al. (2008), Alfaraih (2009), Hassaan (2013a; 2013b), 
Boshnak (2017), every disclosure item in the developed index will be given an identical 
weight in an unweighted approach. By this , the disclosure item is given a score of (1) 
if the company disclosed it and (0) if not, and (N/A) if it is not applicable to the entity 
concerned. This means that if the disclosure item is not applicable to the studied 
company, it is dropped from the firms score (Boshnak, 2017).   
Tsalavoutas & Evans (2010) state that there are two unweighted approaches to 
measure compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements. These are the 
dichotomous approach (also known as Cooke’s method) which is the most commonly 
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used approach, and the partial compliance (PC) unweighted approach. Tsalavoutas & 
Evans (2010) conducted a study to compare the two methods of measuring compliance 
with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements on a sample of companies. Alongside 
others who studied both methods (eg: Abdullah & Minhat, 2013, Abdullah et al., 2015) 
the authors found that the two methods exhibit considerably different overall 
compliance scores (ranking orders). Hence, they suggest the simultaneous use of both 
methods whilst measuring compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements 
in order to reach concrete and robust results that will carry more informative findings.  
As such, this thesis will simultaneously employ both methods. Table 3 clarifies the 
measurement instruments used by each study of relative similarity to this thesis. Given 
the fact that most disclosure studies measure compliance with disclosure requirements 
by using Cooke’s method (the dichotomous approach) with only a selected few 
focusing on partial compliance, this study aims to add to the literature which uses partial 
compliance to examine possible difference in results. 
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Table 3. Measurement Methods Used in Previous Studies 
 
Study 
Years 
studied 
Country 
Sample of 
listed 
entities 
standards 
# of 
items 
Method 
Street & 
Gray (2002) 
1998 Global 279 12 IAS - Cooke’s 
Yeoh 
(2005) 
1996 - 
1998 
New 
Zealand 
49 non-
financial  
FRS’s 495 Cooke’s 
Al-
Shammari 
et al. (2008) 
1996-
2002 
GCC 137 14 IAS 160 Cooke’s 
Taylor et al. 
(2008) 
2005 Australia 30 FID 120 Cooke’s 
Al-Akra et 
al. (2010) 
1996 – 
2004 
Jordan 
80 non-
financial 
1996:19 
2004: 31 
1996: 
301 
2004: 
641 
Cooke’s 
Tsalavoutas 
(2011) 
2005 Greece 153 31IAS/IFRS 481 
Cooke’s 
and PC 
Abdullah & 
Minhat 
(2013) 
2008 Malaysia  225 12 IFRS 295 
Cooke’s 
and PC 
Hassaan 
(2013a) 
2007 Jordan 
75 non-
financial 
IFRS 275 Cooke’s 
Hassaan 
(2013b) 
2007 Egypt 
75 non-
financial 
IFRS 275 Cooke’s 
Aljifri et al 
(2014)  
2005 UAE 153 IAS/IFRS 317 Cooke’s 
Abdullah et 
al. (2015) 
2015 Malaysia 221 12 IFRS 295 PC 
Ebrahim & 
Fattah 
(2015) 
2007 Egypt 116 
IAS 12 & 
EAS 24 
N/A Cooke’s 
Alfraih 
2016 
2010 Kuwait 
132 non-
financial  
26 IFRS 439 Cooke’s 
Juhmani 
(2016) 
2010 Bahrain 41 27 IFRS 224 Cooke’s 
AL-Sartawi 
et al (2017) 
2015 Bahrain 39 IAS -1 N/A Cooke’s 
Agyei- 
Mensah 
(2017) 
2011-
2013 
Ghana 90 IFRS 7 - Cooke’s 
Boshnak 
(2017) 
2010-
2013 
GCC 392 24 325 Cooke’s 
Nalukenge 
et al. (2018) 
2014 Uganda 
85 
microfinance 
institutions 
15 IFRSs - Cooke’s 
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4.4.2 The Dichotomous Approach  
The conventionally termed ‘unweighted approach’, ‘dichotomous’, or 
‘Cooke’s’ method has been widely used in many previous studies that examined 
compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements (e.g. Cooke, 1992; Ahmed 
& Nicholls, 1994; Street & Bryant, 2000; Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Glaum & 
Street, 2003; Yeoh, 2005; Hogdon, Tondkar, Harless & Adhikari, 2008). The 
dichotomous approach gives the individual items required to be disclosed by all 
standards equal weights; giving higher weights to those standards which require more 
items to be disclosed which will make them appear to be of higher importance than 
those with lower disclosure items (Al-Shiab, 2003). This method depicts that if a 
mandatory item is disclosed, it is given a score of 1; whereas if it is not disclosed, it 
would be scored as 0 or “N/A” if the item is not relevant to the firm (Tsalavoutas & 
Evans, 2010). The benefit of using such method in a complex study on compliance 
measurement is that a firm will not be penalized should it not have a certain item 
disclosed if the item was not relevant to it (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Cooke, 1992; Abdullah 
& Minhat, 2013). As argued by Cooke (1989), this approach adds subjectivity to 
dichotomous methods. Nonetheless, not using this method may result in firms that are 
diversified to get higher disclosure scores than they usually would (Boshnak, 2017).  
Each company is scored separately and is calculated as the ratio of total number 
of items disclosed to the maximum score possible (maximum possible number of 
items): 
𝐷𝐶𝑆𝑞𝑦 =  
𝑇 =   ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1
𝑀 =   ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
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Where: 
𝐷𝐶𝑆𝑞𝑦: Disclosure Compliance Score of company (q) for the year (y) 
T: Total number of items disclosed by company (q) 
M: maximum number of disclosure items which are applicable that could have been 
disclosed by company (q) 
d= 1 if item is disclosed 
d= 0 if item is not disclosed,  
 𝐷𝐶𝑆𝑞𝑦 (Disclosure Compliance Score) is the total compliance score for every 
company for the year (y); 0 ≤ DCSq  ≤ 1. T is the number of total disclosed items (𝑑𝑖) 
of the company (q). M represents the maximum applicable items of which company (q) 
is anticipated to disclose. As previously mentioned, this thesis sets out to study the 
sample across three years, hence, the compliance score will be measured for each entity 
for the time period included in the thesis. 
However, as argued by Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010), the dichotomous 
approach involves a weakness that the number of items required under different 
standards vary. Al-Shiab (2003) states that the result of applying an equal weight for 
each item would lead to a standard which entails more items to be disclosed as having 
higher importance than those standards with lower disclosure items. To elaborate 
further, some of the chosen standards (such as IAS 1) would entail a higher amount of 
items to be disclosed; whilst other standards (like IAS 2) involve a few disclosure items; 
hence, under the dichotomous approach, IAS 1 appears as having higher importance 
than IAS 2. Thus, standards which have more disclosure items included in the overall 
index are unintentionally treated unequally with those standards with a lesser amount 
of disclosure items (Al-Shiab, 2003). Therefore, Tsalavoutas & Evans (2010) state that 
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the application of the PC method simultaneously would conclude in more informative 
results. Consequently, this thesis also deploys the alternative method of PC.  
3.4.3 The Partial Compliance Unweighted Approach (PC)  
A number of studies used the partial compliance approach to avoid any probable 
bias contributed by the dichotomous approach. These included studies by Al-Shiab 
(2003, 2008), Tsalavoutas & Evans (2011), Abdullah & Minhat (2013) and Abdullah 
et al. (2015). The PC approach assumes each of the given items in the standards are of 
equal importance and hence gives each standard an equal weight. The scoring process 
under the PC approach is the same as the one used under the dichotomous method in 
the sense that they are both ‘unweighted’ (1 if the item is disclosed, 0 if not, and NA if 
not relevant) (Abdullah & Minhat, 2013). However, the factor differentiating the two 
measurement methods lies in the calculation of the total compliance score. Under the 
PC method, the ratio is calculated by summing the extent of compliance with each item 
under each standard and then this total is divided by sum of standards that are applicable 
to the company (Abdullah & Minhat, 2013), as in the formula depicted below:  
  
𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑞𝑦 =  
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑖=1
𝑅𝑞
 
Where: 
𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑞𝑦: Partial Compliance Score of company (q) for the year (y) 
X: the compliance level with each standard 
Rq: total number of standards applicable to company q 
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 𝑃𝐶𝑞𝑦 is the total score of compliance for each firm (q) for year (y); 0 ≤ PCSq  
≤ 1. 𝑋𝑖 is the compliance level with mandatory disclosure requirements of each 
standard. 𝑅𝑞 reflects the total number of standards applicable to company (q). In other 
words, the compliance with each standard’s disclosure items is calculated separately. 
After that the total sum of  compliance scores (X) is divided by the total number of 
standards applicable to each company (𝑅𝑞) (Tsalavoutas & Evans, 2010).  This scoring 
approach alongside the dichotomous method is illustrated below. 
3.4.4 The Dichotomous Approach vs The Partial Compliance Approach 
Illustrated  
Based on a descriptive theoretical example used by Tsalavoutas and Evans 
(2010), the method of computing the scores of compliance according to each approach 
is computed as follows. Assuming company (X) complies with one item of the three 
disclosure items required under Standard A, two items of the five disclosure items of 
standard B, and complies with seven of the nine disclosure items required by standard 
C. The compliance score would differ under each approach in the set example. For the 
dichotomous approach, the compliance score is calculated as the sum of all items the 
company disclosed divided by the total number of items under all three standards: 
DCS= (10/17) = 0.59 or 59%. Tsalavoutas & Evans (2010) further explain by showing 
the results under the PC unweighted approach as PCS= [(1/3)+(2/5)+(7/9)/3]= 0.50 or 
50%. As seen, the PC approach takes into account the level of compliance with each 
standard. As explained by the authors, although there is a low level of compliance with 
the disclosure items in standards A and B, it is outweighed by the high compliance in 
standard C. This shows that the dichotomous approach may result in a misleading score 
which is affected by higher compliance with one standard (Tsalavoutas & Evans, 2010).  
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A second scenario would be to assume that the company shows a higher level 
of compliance in standards A and B, and a lower compliance with standard C; all three 
items in standard A and four items of the five in standard B, and only three out of the 
nine of standard C. The results would still be the same under the dichotomous approach 
DCS= (10/17) = 0.59 or 59%. On the other hand, the score in this scenario would differ 
under the PC approach where PCS= [(3/3)+(4/5)+(3/9)/3] = 0.74 or 74%. As stated by 
Tsalavoutas (2011), scores under Cooke’s method are bound to be sensitive to the 
number of items by each standard included in the index. Hence, this would result in 
misleading conclusions on the level at which entities comply with disclosures.  
Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010) suggest the use of the PC method by research which 
choose to include standards with a wide range of required disclosure items as it would 
yield results which are less misleading. According to the authors, the PC approach aid 
the identification of standards that are not relevant to certain companies with 
comparable characteristics. Also, it  permits the measurement of compliance with every 
standard on a separate basis which in return would allow for recognizing any clusters 
of non-compliance of specific standards that could be in correlation with other 
variables.  
 Since a majority of studies used the dichotomous approach and a selected few 
used the PC approach, it would be interesting to examine the results of compliance 
under both methods and how the effects of variables would translate onto compliance 
in both methods. 
3.4.5 Limitations of The Scoring Instruments  
Regardless of the method deployed to calculate the level of compliance with 
mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements, the researcher would need to use subjectivity 
to decide whether a required disclosure item is applicable to a company and if it was 
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complied with (Tsalavoutas & Evans, 2010). However, it is also worthy to state that the 
PC approach is considered more prone to the researcher’s skills to give a score to more 
complicated standards.  
3.4.6 Validity of The Scoring Process 
Tsalavoutas & Evans (2010) state that the concept of reliability revolves around 
the measurements accuracy. In other words, it is how proper the concept examined is 
measured. However, it is vital to ensure the mitigation of uncertainties that may arise 
during the scoring procedure. Hence, this thesis follows a few steps consistent with 
previous similar studies: 
1. After the researcher of this thesis built the index which included all mandatory 
disclosure items, the annual report of the firm is read fully and cautiously. 
According to Boshnak (2017), the reason for this step to be taken before scoring 
is to allow the researcher to apprehend the firms operations. This would allow 
for the avoidance of chastening those companies for not complying with 
mandatory disclosures of those standards (Cooke, 1992). This method was 
followed by Cooke (1989) and Boshnak (2017). 
2. The figures of the chosen years disclosure item are crosschecked against its 
preceding and succeeding year. This is in line with approaches used by Wallace 
et al., (1994); Owusu-Ansah (1998, 2000); Rahman et al., (2011); Boshnak 
(2017).  
3.4.7 Reliability of The Scoring Instruments 
The concept of reliability revolves around how accurate the measurement is 
together with its stability, consistency, and precision (Tsalavoutas & Evans, 2010). In 
order to certify that the scoring methods as well as the index are reliable, a pilot scoring 
was done by an expert auditor on IFRS for 12  firms selected from the sample. This is 
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also done in similar studies (e.g. Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Abdullah et al., 2015). 
4.5 Research Model  
This thesis opts to investigate the corporate governance factors, namely board 
characteristics and ownership structures, that may influence the extent of compliance 
with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. The research model of this thesis 
is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Research model 
 
 As highlighted in the prior section, the compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements is the dependent variable which will be examined through the 
use of a self-constructed index which includes all mandatory disclosure requirements 
applicable to the sample chosen and to the country setting of Qatar. To reach the 
percentage score which mirrors the level of compliance with mandatory disclosures, 
two scoring methods were used. These methods are Cooke’s method which is also 
known as the dichotomous approach and the partial compliance method. Therefore, the 
research model will study the associations between the corporate governance 
mechanisms chosen and the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosures under 
Independent Variables 
Board Characteristics 
H1: Gender Diversity 
H2: Board Size  
H3: CEO Duality 
H4: Founding Family Members 
H5: Non-executive Directors 
H6: Cross-directorship 
 
Ownership Structures 
H7: Institutional Ownership 
H8: Government Ownership 
H9: Foreign Ownership 
Extent of 
Compliance with 
Mandatory 
IAS/IFRS 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
 
Firm Size 
Profitability 
Liquidity 
Firm Age 
Auditor Type 
Control Variables 
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two sets of approaches. The chosen variables for this study are displayed in Table 4.  
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝐶𝑆 = β0 + β1𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸 + β2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + β3𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 + β4𝐹𝑀 + β5𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐷 +
β6𝐶𝑅𝑆 + β7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + β8𝐺𝑂𝑉 + β9𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 + β10𝐹𝑆 + β11𝑅𝑂𝐴 + β12𝐿𝑄 +
β13𝐹𝐴 + β14𝐴𝑇 +Ɛ  
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐶𝑆 = β0 + β1𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸 + β2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + β3𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 + β4𝐹𝑀 + β5𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐷 +
β6𝐶𝑅𝑆 + β7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 + β8𝐺𝑂𝑉 + β9𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 + β10𝐹𝑆 + β11𝑅𝑂𝐴 + β12𝐿𝑄 +
β13𝐹𝐴 + β14𝐴𝑇 +Ɛ  
Where, 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝐶𝑆 =  the mandatory disclosure index measured by the dichotomous approach 
 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐶𝑆 = the mandatory disclosure index measure by the partial compliance 
approach.  
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Table 4. Operationalization of the Independent and Control Variables 
 
To conclude, this chapter highlighted the several data collection methods for 
each of the concerned variables in this study. This study is longitudinal since it 
investigates the same sample across several years; the years of 2015, 2016, and 2017. 
The sample selected for this study were 24 listed non-financial firms for every year in 
Variable Symbol Operationalization Source 
Board characteristics    
Gender 
diversity 
FEMALE Dummy variable = 1 if a female is 
present on the board; and 0 
otherwise 
Alfraih (2016) 
Board size BSIZE Total number of members on the 
board 
Ebrahim & 
Fattah (2015); 
Alfraih (2016) 
CEO duality DUALITY Dummy variable = 1 if the 
chairman of the board and the 
CEO are the by the same 
individual and = 0 otherwise 
Ebrahim & 
Fattah (2015); 
Alfraih (2016) 
Founding 
family 
members  
FM Dummy variable = 1 if there is at 
least one member of the founding 
family sits on the board 
Ebrahim & 
Fattah (2015) 
Non-executive 
Directors 
NEXD (Ratio) (number of independent 
members to total number of 
directors on the board) 
Al-Akra et 
al.(2010); 
Ebrahim & 
Fattah (2015) 
Cross-
directorship 
CRS (Ratio) number of directors with 
cross directorships to total number 
of directors   
Alfraih (2016) 
    
Ownership Structures   
Government 
Ownership 
GOV Percentage of government owned 
shares 
Ebrahim & 
Fattah (2015) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
INST Percentage of shares owned by 
institutions  
Agyei-Mensah 
(2017) 
Foreign 
Ownership 
FOREIGN Percentage of foreign owned 
shares   
Al-Akra et al. 
(2010) 
Control variables   
Firm size FS Natural log of total assets Alfraih (2016) 
Profitability ROA The return on assets Agyei-Mensah 
(2017) 
Liquidity LQ Natural log of current ratio Vlachos (2001) 
Firm age FA Number of years the company has 
operated  
Alfraih (2016) 
Auditor type AT Dummy variable = 1, if Big 4; 
Dummy variable = 0, if not 
Al-Sartawi et 
al. (2016) 
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this study, leading to a total sample of 72 annual reports examined. The construction of 
the mandatory index alongside the validity and reliability measures taken were 
underlined. Likewise, the scoring process of the 216 items in the mandatory index were 
done so by using two different measurement instruments, the dichotomous approach 
and partial compliance approach. The differences amongst these methods and their 
reliability tests were also highlighted in this chapter. Finally, this chapter concludes 
with the research models used under both compliance scoring methods.  
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Chapter 5: Results and Analysis  
This chapter will be divided into several parts. The descriptive statistics section 
will display descriptive results for the dependent variable (under the two scoring 
methods) and the independent variables. The second part of the results chapter will 
document the results of Pearson’s correlation, normality tests, and multicollinearity 
tests. The third section of this chapter will highlight the multiple linear regression 
results where the results will be discussed by comparing between the results of the 
dependent variable under the dichotomous scoring method and partial compliance 
method.  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
5.1.1 Dependent Variable: Mandatory Disclosure Index  
The dependent variable in this thesis is the extent of compliance with mandatory 
IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. The score of compliance is reached by measuring it 
under two methods, the dichotomous approach and the partial compliance approach 
leading to the Disclosure Compliance Score (DCS) and Partial Compliance Score 
(PCS). As previously discussed in chapter 4, the dichotomous scoring method sums the 
total number of items disclosed by an entity and divides it by the total applicable items 
to that entity. The partial compliance approach is detailed in the sense that it calculates 
the compliance with each standard and divides it by the total number of standards rather 
than items. For example, the total number items disclosed under standard A divided by 
the total number of applicable items in standard A. The result of the aforementioned 
will then be divided by the total number of standards applicable to that company. 
Appendices B, C, D show the results of calculating the extent of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS items under the dichotomous scoring method for the years of 
2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively. Appendices E, F, and G show the end results under 
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the partial compliance calculation method for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017, 
respectively.  
Table 5 portrays the final results reached for each entity after conducting the 
scoring process under the two methods included in this study; dichotomous and partial 
compliance. The results reflect the extent of compliance by each entity (each entity was 
given a number) over the years for each method. The extent of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure under the dichotomous scoring method portrays an 
average score of 85% for 2015, and 87% for both 2016 and 2017. Meanwhile, the extent 
of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure under the partial compliance score 
is at an average of 73%, 81% and 80% for the years of 2015, 2016, and 2017, 
respectively.  These results are consistent with the findings of studies which used both 
methods to score the index, where the dichotomous approach generated higher results. 
Tsalavoutas & Evans (2010) found that the dichotomous method led to higher scores 
of compliance in their sample which they state could result in deceptive views on the 
degree of companies compliance with accounting standards disclosure requirements. 
Also, the results donated to the literature by Street & Gray (2001), Tsalavoutas & Evans 
(2010) prove the concern above and the importance of applying both methods. The 
documented outcomes of their results indicate the presence of different compliance 
scores under each method.  
To put it into perspective, company (1) in this thesis had compliance scores 
under the dichotomous method of 86%, 87%, 85% over 2015, 2016, and 2017, 
respectively. Company (1) had scores of 85%, 92% and 90% over 2015, 2016 and 2017 
respectively under the partial compliance method. The eminent difference was because 
the PCS took into consideration company (1)’s improved compliance with some of the 
standards and items applicable to it, as opposed to the DCS which takes the wholesome 
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number of items disclosed, disregarding probable compliance changes within the 
standards themselves.  
 
 
Table 5. Extent of Compliance Under DCS and PCS Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, it is extremely vital to note that the abovementioned discussion is to 
illustrate the importance of conducting both scoring methods and the differences they 
hold. This thesis does not attempt to study the improvements or differences in 
  
Company # 
  DCS          PCS   
2015 2016 2017   Company # 2015 2016 2017 
1 86% 87% 85% 
 
1 85% 92% 90% 
2 84% 85% 84% 
 
2 70% 72% 87% 
3 89% 91% 88% 
 
3 91% 98% 98% 
4 84% 86% 87% 
 
4 72% 85% 73% 
5 87% 90% 91% 
 
5 85% 93% 94% 
6 89% 92% 92% 
 
6 77% 86% 77% 
7 80% 84% 84% 
 
7 69% 78% 78% 
8 72% 72% 74% 
 
8 63% 65% 70% 
9 90% 93% 95% 
 
9 96% 87% 89% 
10 83% 86% 86% 
 
10 60% 68% 68% 
11 90% 95% 94% 
 
11 62% 73% 73% 
12 78% 81% 82% 
 
12 68% 76% 76% 
13 89% 92% 92% 
 
13 38% 46% 46% 
14 75% 79% 80% 
 
14 49% 58% 60% 
15 88% 92% 91% 
 
15 67% 95% 85% 
16 84% 87% 88% 
 
16 83% 90% 92% 
17 90% 91% 91% 
 
17 69% 77% 76% 
18 81% 82% 82% 
 
18 84% 90% 90% 
19 86% 88% 88% 
 
19 83% 92% 92% 
20 83% 86% 86% 
 
20 88% 89% 88% 
21 89% 92% 92% 
 
21 78% 86% 86% 
22 89% 92% 93% 
 
22 66% 74% 75% 
23 81% 86% 85% 
 
23 74% 87% 66% 
24 86% 86% 89% 
 
24 75% 81% 84% 
                  
Mean  85% 87% 87%   Mean  73% 81% 80% 
Max.  90% 95% 95%   Maximum  96% 98% 98% 
Min.  72% 72% 74%   Minimum  38% 46% 46% 
Total Sample Score 86%   Total Sample Score 78%  
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compliance levels over the sample years. These results are merely an explanatory 
illustration. Instead, this thesis takes into account the total average compliance score of 
each method for all three years as shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
 
 
In Table 6 Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the self-constructed 
disclosure index (INDEX) in relation to the results under both scoring methods. The 
results depicted are for the total sample size as opposed to each individual year. For the 
Dependent Variable          N=72 Minimum  Maximum  Mean  SD  
Panel A: Dependent Variable (INDEX) Both scoring methods    
DCS 0.72 0.95 0.86 0.05 
PCS 0.38 0.98 0.78 0.13 
Independent Variables      N=72 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Panel B: Continuous variables          
Board Size (BSIZE) 5 11 8.50 1.70 
Non-Executive Directors 
(NEXD) 0.67 1 0.93 0.08 
Cross directorship (CRS) 0 0.83 0.22 0.19 
Institutional ownership (INST) 0 0.77 0.24 0.25 
Government ownership (GOV) 0 1 0.11 0.26 
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) 0 1 0.21 0.33 
          
Panel C: Dummy Variables     Yes % 
Female member (FEMALE)    10 13.9 
CEO duality (DUALITY)    8 11.1 
Family members (FM)    12 16.7 
          
Control Variables  Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Panel D: Continuous variables          
Firm Size (FS) 20.07 25.27 22.78 1.25 
Profitability (ROA) -0.07 0.18 0.0638 0.04518 
Liquidity (LQ) -0.68 2.37 0.7048 0.61714 
Firm Age (FA) 2.00 67.00 21.12 16.78 
          
Panel E: Dummy variables     Yes % 
Auditor Type (AT)    68 94.4 
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sample of 72 listed non-financial entities, the average levels of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements was 0.86 or 86% under the DCS and 0.78 
or 78% under the PCS. Tsalavoutas (2011) found a compliance score of 83% under the 
dichotomous approach and 79% under partial compliance. Street and Gray (2002) 
found a total score of 74% under the dichotomous score and 72% under partial 
compliance. Likewise, Abdullah & Minhat (2013) found scores of 89% by the 
dichotomous scoring method and 84% by the partial compliance approach. Tsalavoutas 
(2011) states that findings as such portray the level of sensitivity in the scores when the 
dichotomous method is used as a result of the number of items required under each 
standard. Therefore, it is safe to denote that the dichotomous approach generates a 
higher compliance score than the partial compliance approach for allocating more 
weight to those standards that require more disclosures (Abdullah & Minhat, 2013).  
The differences among the illustrated results above explain the differences 
between the two scoring methods. The DCS shows little to no change over the years. 
This is because the DCS consists of summing the whole number of disclosed items and 
dividing it by the total number of applicable items, ignoring possible compliance 
differences within each standard every year. In other words, standards are treated 
unequally where standards with more items are assumed to have higher importance than 
those with a lower number of items. This leads to the obscuration of low compliance 
with one standard by higher compliance with another, dismissing the actual extent of 
compliance with one standard. Ultimately, birthing similar results over the years. On 
the other hand, the PCS measures the level of compliance with each standard under 
examination, which ultimately treats all standards fairly.   
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5.1.2 Independent Variables: Board Characteristics and Ownership Structures 
The independent variables for the study were either continuous or binary 
(dummy) variables as shown under Panel B of Table 6. The size of the board (BSIZE) 
had a minimum of 5 members, maximum of 11 members and 8 members on average. 
The table also presents that the highest ratio of non-executive directors within the 
sample was 1; indicating that some of the companies have a board with only non-
executive members. Moreover, cross directorships were eminent in the sample with an 
evident maximum of 83% and an average of 22% of board members on one entity 
sitting on other boards. The descriptive statistics also show that there were 10 females 
present on the board in the sample studied. This shows that across the 24 non-financial 
companies chosen for this study only 13.9% of the boards were females in the time 
period of 2015 to 2017 of the sample. Also, there were 8 cases of CEO duality in the 
sample over the years. Finally, it was reported that there were 12 cases of presence of 
founding family members on the board of directors 
5.1.3 Control Variables  
Descriptive statistics for the control variables are shown in Panel D and E. Panel 
D depicts the results for the continuous variables which shows the average firm size in 
the sample calculated by the natural log of total assets was 23. The average profitability 
of the firms in the sample was 0.0638 or 6.38% and a maximum of 0.18 or 18%. 
Moreover, Liquidity was at an average of 0.7048 and the average firm age was 21 years. 
Finally, Panel E portrays the descriptive statistic of the type of auditor where 68 firms 
from the sample used a Big 4 firm which is 94.4% of the sample.  
5.2 Correlation 
Presence of high correlation between variables may cause an issue of 
multicollinearity and in return will affect the model’s reliability (Acock, 2008). 
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Consequently, investigating the correlation between independent variables is vital 
(Tabachnick, Fidell & Ullman, 2007). In order to conduct the correlation between the 
variables, the Pearsons correlation is used. This has been used in disclosure studies by 
Hassaan (2013a, 2013b), Alfraih (2016), and Boshnak (2017), amongst others. The 
matrix examines the linear relationship between the variables in this study. Pearson’s 
correlation matrix is  presented in Table 7 below.
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D
C
S 
  DCS PCS FEMALE BSIZE DUALITY FM NEXD CRS INST GOV FOREIGN FS ROA LQ FA AT 
DCS 1                               
PCS .276* 1                             
FEMALE -.283* -0.124 1                           
BSIZE -0.195 0.135 -0.119 1                         
DUALITY .238* .264* -0.142 0.105 1                       
FM 0.081 .325** .251* .242* 0.198 1                     
NEXD 
-
.313** 0.203 0.067 0.156 -0.227 -0.087 1                   
CRS 
0.159 -0.044 -.311** -0.167 -0.155 
-
.403** 
-
0.115 1                 
INST .356** 0.161 -0.124 -0.09 0.133 -0.082 -0.01 0.051 1               
GOV 
.270* -0.069 -0.172 -0.094 0.221 -0.196 
-
0.118 0.209 .569** 1             
FOREIGN 
-.285* -.247* -0.098 0.035 -0.025 -0.057 
-
0.026 -0.05 
-
.477** -0.224 1           
FS .289* 0.23 -0.019 0.056 0.059 0.026 0.063 .251* .558** .372** -0.188 1         
ROA 
-0.224 -0.083 -0.08 -0.055 0.09 -0.158 0.09 
-
0.084 -0.093 0.037 0.126 -.371** 1       
LQ 0.145 -0.147 0.004 -0.225 .311** 0.011 -0.12 -0.02 .280* .431** 0.045 0.087 .473** 1     
FA 
-0.195 0.108 -0.032 .562** 0.066 0.124 
-
0.182 
-
0.012 -0.167 -0.077 -0.113 -0.028 0.134 
-
0.136 1   
AT 
.241* 0.051 0.097 0.036 -0.107 0.108 
-
0.096 
-
0.073 -0.042 -0.066 0.122 0.047 
-
.313** -0.15 0.024 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
Table 7.  Pearsons Correlation 
Table 7. 
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In order to ensure that this study is not prone to multicollinearity issues, 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were examined and documented no concerning 
correlations. Field (2009) and Pallant (2013) state that concerns should be heightened 
when the VIF is greater than 10. Table 8 depicts that VIF for all variables are below 10. 
Another indicator of multicollinearity is the tolerance level. Weisburd and Britt (2007) 
denote that any figure below 0.20 suggests serious multicollinearity. All variables show 
a tolerance level over 0.2 with the lowest level of tolerance being 0.34 and the highest 
at 0.834. Hence, multicollinearity is not an issue of concern in this study.  
 
 
Table 8. Multicollinearity Statistics 
 
 
It is vital to check for normality amongst the continuous variables chosen to be 
studied in this thesis. The normality tests run were by P-P plots as well as numeric tests: 
skewness and Kurtosis. Frequency distributions ‘Probability – Probability’ plots (P-P 
plots) are a good choice to show the whole distribution shape. P-P plots is considered a 
Independent Variable  Tolerance VIF 
Female Members (FEMALE) 0.72 1.388 
Board Size (BSIZE) 0.482 2.074 
CEO duality (DUALITY) 0.736 1.359 
Members of the founding family (FM) 0.646 1.548 
Non-executive directors (NEXD) 0.671 1.49 
Cross directorship (CRS) 0.595 1.682 
Institutional ownership (INST) 0.34 2.945 
Government ownership (GOV) 0.522 1.914 
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) 0.571 1.752 
Firm size (FS) 0.44 2.273 
Profitability (ROA) 0.439 2.279 
Liquidity (LQ) 0.455 2.2 
Firm age (FA) 0.462 2.163 
Auditor type (AT) 0.834 1.2 
  
96 
 
useful plot to check for normality (Field, 2013). These were conducted twice; once for 
each model in this study, DCS and PCS results. These frequency distributions are found 
in Appendix H. With reference to both P-P plots, normality can be assumed as there 
appear to be no drastic deviations from the normality line.  
In order to ensure numeric normality, tests were also run on the continuous 
variables used in this thesis. Table 9 highlights all those continuous variables excluding 
female members, members from the founding family, CEO duality, and auditor type as 
these were binary variables. The normality tests made were skewness, which indicates 
lack of symmetry, and kurtosis which shows pointiness (Field, 2013).  
 
 
Table 9. Numerical Results of Normality Tests 
 
 
5.4 Regression Analysis  
This thesis aims to investigate the extent of compliance with mandatory 
IAS/IFRS disclosures and the corporate governance factors which influence it, namely: 
board characteristics and ownership structures. Therefore, the best regression to 
accomplish this objective given the multiple variables present is the multiple regression 
  Skewness  Kurtosis  
 Variable  Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Board size (BSIZE) -0.106 0.283 -1.087 0.559 
Non-Executive directors (NEXD) -0.818 0.283 0.165 0.559 
Cross directorship (CRS) 1.156 0.283 1.754 0.559 
Institutional ownership (INST) 0.722 0.283 -0.818 0.559 
Government ownership (GOV) 2.241 0.283 3.784 0.559 
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) 1.562 0.283 0.69 0.559 
Firm size (FS) -0.09 0.283 -0.617 0.559 
Profitability (ROA) -0.035 0.283 0.792 0.559 
Liquidity (LQ) 0.826 0.283 1.18 0.559 
Firm age (FA) 1.559 0.283 1.307 0.559 
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model. This approach was used by many extant studies (e.g.: Al-Akra et al., 2010; 
Boshnak, 2017). The results highlighted in Table 10 and in the upcoming section will 
include both models studied in this thesis. Each model consists of the same independent 
and control variables but differs in the dependent variables’ outcome. The dependent 
variable is the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements and is 
measured by the dichotomous approach and partial compliance approach. Therefore, 
the hypotheses will be interpreted under both results of the dependent variables.  
 
 
 Table 10. Multiple Regression Results Under Both Compliance Scoring Methods 
 
 
 
Variable Unstandar
dized 
Coefficien
ts 
Standardiz
ed 
Coefficient
s 
DCS Unstandardiz
ed 
Coefficients 
Standardiz
ed 
Coefficient
s 
PCS 
 
B Beta sig. B Beta sig. 
(Constant) 0.807 
 
0 -0.204 
 
0.56 
FEMALE -0.054 -0.361 0.001**
* 
-0.077 -0.207 0.081* 
BSIZE -0.002 -0.072 0.582 -0.015 -0.198 0.169 
DUALITY 0.021 0.126 0.239 0.142 0.345 0.004**
* 
FM 0.016 0.113 0.32 0.133 0.384 0.003**
* 
NEXD -0.183 -0.274 0.016** 0.54 0.322 0.01** 
CRS 0.005 0.018 0.879 0.06 0.087 0.5 
INST -0.014 -0.068 0.664 0.059 0.113 0.509 
GOV -0.002 -0.011 0.933 -0.075 -0.15 0.277 
FOREIGN -0.059 -0.379 0.002**
* 
-0.065 -0.166 0.209 
FS 0.009 0.226 0.102 0.022 0.211 0.163 
ROA -0.009 -0.008 0.955 0.481 0.167 0.267 
LQ 0.007 0.089 0.508 -0.06 -0.283 0.058 
FA -0.001 -0.281 0.039 0.001 0.132 0.367 
AT 0.068 0.305 0.003 0.069 0.122 0.263 
       
𝑅2   0.534   0.443 
Adjusted R²  0.419   0.306 
Notes: * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01 
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5.5 Discussion of the Results  
Table 10 above highlights the results of the multiple regression conducted to 
reach the objective of this study. It highlights two columns portraying the significance 
levels under the two scoring methods used, the Dichotomous Compliance Score (DCS) 
and the Partial Compliance Score (PCS). The adjusted R square was 0.419 under the 
DCS model, which implied that 41.9% of the mandatory disclosure index variation is 
explained by the independent variables examined in this study. Furthermore, the 
adjusted R square under the PCS model depicts that a total of 30.6% of the dependent 
mandatory disclosure index variable is explained by the independent variables.  
H1 of this thesis study predicted no association between the presence of females 
on the board of directors and the level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements. The results in Table 10 show that the variable of female 
members on the board is significantly negatively correlated to the level of compliance 
with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure under the DCS (P < 0.01). This result is 
inconsistent with findings of similar studies which used the dichotomous scoring 
method for their indices in the region where Alfraih (2016) found a significant positive 
correlation between female members on the board and compliance with mandatory 
disclosures. Likewise, presence of female members on the board was found to have a 
significant negative correlation (P < 0.10) with the level of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures under the partial compliance method. Therefore, the presence of female 
members on the board is negatively associated with the extent of compliance with 
Mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements in the State of Qatar for the sample. An 
explanation for this negative relationship could be deduced from the lack of a specific 
law in Qatar requiring female members on boards. Hence, if there were laws requiring 
presence of females on the board, the result documented from the sample may be 
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eminently different.  
A larger number of members on the board is often argued to impair the 
effectiveness of the board to make timely strategic decisions as a result of possible 
communication and coordination issues. However, it is also argued that a larger board 
size brings diverse expertise to the board which translates into higher financial 
compliance. Therefore, this study assumed no relationship  between board size and the 
level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements to investigate 
the direction of this variable. The results of the regression depict that there is no 
significant correlation between the size of the board and compliance with mandatory 
disclosures under the dichotomous score for listed non-financial entities in Qatar. 
Opposite to the proposition by John and Senbet (1998), it can be denoted that  the size 
of the board may not be an efficient intermediate to the agency problem born from 
conflicts of interest. This result is inconsistent with prior studies that used the 
dichotomous scoring methods. Alfraih (2016) found that board size has a significant 
positive correlation with the levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures. 
Similarly, the results of the regression under the PCS shows that there is no significant 
relationship between the variable of board size and the extent of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures. Therefore, a large number of members on the board 
of directors in Qatari listed non-financial entities would not necessarily translate into 
better degrees of compliance with IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. 
Combining the roles of the CEO and the Chairman would give power to a single 
individual and obstruct the process of monitoring the companies’ management. H3 
assumes no association between CEO duality and the level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures. Referring to Table 10, CEO duality had no significant impact 
on the level of compliance with disclosures under the dichotomous scoring method. 
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This is in line with findings by Hassaan (2013b).  Contrary to the assumption of H3, 
CEO duality was found to have a positive and significant correlation with the extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures under the PCS model (P < 0.01).  However, the 
results illustrated by both models are inconsistent with most prior studies which found 
that CEO duality would negatively impact levels of disclosures (e.g. Huafang & 
Jianguo, 2007; Alfraih, 2016).  
It is widely conceived that family members can influence the disclosures made 
by their companies to the public. Furthermore, boards of family firms would be less 
likely to comply with mandatory disclosures (Abdullah et al., 2015). However, Floros 
et al. (2008) states that family firms reduce agency costs. As a result of the mixed 
advantages and disadvantages of family members being associated in the daily 
managerial activities of their firms, H4 predicts no association between the presence of 
founding family members on the board and the extent of compliance with mandatory 
IAS/IFRS disclosures. Under the results of the DCS, it is seen that there is no significant 
impact of having a member of the founding family present on the board on the level of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. This result is 
inconsistent with prior studies that used the dichotomous approach and find that family 
members do in fact have a negative correlation to disclosures (Ho & Wong, 2001; 
Mohamed & Sulong, 2010; Alfraih, 2016). H4 is not accepted under the results of the 
PCS model as it documents a positive and significant correlation with the level of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements (P < 0.01). This means 
that the larger number of founding family members on the board in listed entities in 
Qatar, the higher the level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements. This is in line with results by Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) and Ebrahim 
and Fattah (2015) who find a significant positive association between family members 
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on the board and compliance with disclosures. Reasons pertaining to this finding might 
be because family members on the board aim to keep and build a sound reputation for 
their family business in the market. 
H5 expects that there is no association between the proportion of non-executive 
directors present on the board and the level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements. The results of the DCS model depict that the relationship 
between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and level of compliance 
with disclosures is significantly negative (P<0.05), rejecting H5. This coincides with 
the findings of Eng & Mak (2003) who document a significant negative effect of this 
variable on disclosures in Singapore. Contrary to the abovementioned results of the 
DCS model and in support of H5, the PCS model results portray a significant and 
positive correlation between the proportion of non-executive directors and the extent of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures (P < 0.05). The agency theory states 
that the existence of independent non-executive directors reduces chances of 
information asymmetry (Porta et al., 2002). Also, increasing the proportion of 
independent members on the board reduces agency costs and conflicts of interest 
(Mobbs, 2013). Therefore, the result found under the PCS approach supports the 
assumption of the agency theory and is in line with results found by Chen and Jaggi 
(2000), Agyei-Mensah (2017), Boshnak (2017). This correlation may have resulted as 
most of the GCC firms use board independence and non-executive directors to 
maximize the ability of the boards’ enforcement of meeting disclosure requirements 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Boshnak, 2017). 
It is widely believed that members of the board also sitting on other boards 
would more likely be absent from board meetings, be less active and less independent. 
However, it is also depicted that cross-directorship brings a wide range od expertise 
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which benefits the level of compliance within a firm. Therefore, this study assumes that 
there is no association between the presence of a board member on another board of a 
listed firm and the extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures. In line 
with this prediction, the result under the DCS model shows no significant impact of this 
variable on the extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures. Likewise, 
the result under the PCS model portrays the same result. Hence, although it was found 
that a large proportion of the sample had board members sitting on other boards in listed 
firms in Qatar, it is not supported that this would have an impact on the level of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures.  
One of the corporate governance mechanisms characterized by utmost 
importance is ownership. Ownership structure variables studied in this study are 
institutional, government and foreign ownership. H7 assumes no association between 
the extent of institutional ownership and the extent of compliance with IAS/IFRS 
disclosures. The result under the DCS model shows a negative yet insignificant 
correlation between this factor and the extent of compliance. Likewise, the PCS model 
also draws results of institutional ownership having no significant impact on 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. These results are in line 
with the results of studies by (Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010). 
H8 predicts no association between government ownership and the extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures. Both the DCS and PCS models show a 
negative yet insignificant association between this variable and the extent of 
compliance. The result is consistent with Naser et al. (2002), Hassaan (2013b) and 
Juhmani (2017). This in fact indicates that whether or not the local government owns 
shares in listed entities, this will not translate into higher or lower levels of compliance 
with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures in Qatar.  
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Lastly, this thesis hypothesized that foreign ownership would have no 
correlation with the extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements. The result under the DCS model leads to rejecting the hypothesized 
assumption where foreign ownership is found to have a significant negative correlation 
with the extent of compliance with disclosures (P < 0.01). In line with the predicted 
hypothesis, there was no significant relationship between foreign ownership and the 
extent of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures under the partial 
compliance approach. This is consistent with Naser et al. (2002), Crowley (2011), 
Aljifri et al. (2014) and Hassan (2015). Therefore it can be presumed that in Qatar, 
listed non-financial entities are not affected by the base theories of capital need to 
comply more with disclosure to attract more foreign investors.  
In support of the findings of Street and Gray (2002) and Abdullah and Minhat 
(2013), the partial compliance and dichotomous methods for measuring the level of 
compliance produce different scores. Street and Gray (2002) found that industry type 
is significantly correlated with the compliance score under the partial compliance 
approach, but has no significant relationship under the dichotomous approach. 
Consistent with the different results found amongst variables under the two difference 
scores as shown in Table 11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
104 
 
Table 11. Summary of Results 
 
 
To conclude, this chapter highlighted several results. Firstly, it highlighted the 
descriptive statistics associated with the dependent variable which is the mandatory 
disclosure index. It shed a light on the compliance scores under the two different 
methods used, the dichotomous and partial compliance approach which documented 
two different results in line with many previous studies that examined both methods. 
Furthermore, this chapter shed a light on the descriptive statistics of the independent 
variables used in this thesis as well as the Pearson Correlation matrix. Additionally, this 
chapter evidenced that multicollinearity is of no issue to the study at hand. Lastly, the 
multiple regression model results were discussed in the light of both scoring methods 
used. The results highlight the differences in compliance under the two methods and 
how independent variables correlate differently to the extent of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures under different compliance scores. Most of the 
hypotheses of this study were found to have no significant relationship with the 
dependent variable, where only five were evidently found to have an association: the 
presence of female members on the board, the proportion of non-executive directors 
Variable  Hypothesis 
No. 
Predicted 
Relationship 
Results 
DCS 
Results 
PCS 
Female Presence H1 No relationship (-) (-) 
Board Size H2 No relationship Supported Supported 
CEO Duality H3 No relationship Supported (+) 
Family members H4 No relationship Supported (+) 
Non-executive 
directors  
H5 No relationship (-) (+) 
Cross directorship H6 No relationship Supported Supported 
Institutional 
ownership 
H7 No relationship Supported Supported 
Government 
ownership  
H8 No relationship Supported Supported 
Foreign ownership H9 No relationship (-) Supported 
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and foreign ownership are negatively correlated to the level of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements. Additionally, CEO duality,  the presence 
of members of the founding family on the board and non-executive directors were found 
to be positively associated with the level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS 
disclosure requirements.  
The differences in empirical results from running the regression in the light of 
two different disclosure scores raises interests as well as concerns on the empirical 
results concluded by prior studies which only used the dichotomous approach. A fact 
to bear in mind is that the results of the dichotomous scoring method unfairly scores 
standards and thus, are inclined to be more biased towards higher compliance scores. 
Hence, empirically investigating disclosures under both methods is of particular 
importance in future research.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions  
Interconnectivity of the global business market in the present day alongside the 
heightened calls for financial disclosure transparency in the era of increased financial 
fraud eminently led to the adoption of best practices in accounting. Those best practices 
are highlighted under the set of guidelines to be followed called the IFRS, previously 
IAS. However, these best practices could not be implemented in organizations that lack  
proper corporate governance structures and factors. These corporate governance 
structures are believed to have four contributing factors to their succession: ownership 
structures, board structures (board characteristics), financial data transparency and 
audit committees (Dahawy, 2009). Three of those vital mechanisms were the essence 
of this study.  
This thesis sets out to examine the extent of compliance with mandatory 
IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements and the factors of corporate governance which affect 
it, namely: board characteristics and ownership structures. In that context, this thesis 
does not intend to focus on the relevance of the accounting disclosures made to users 
but on whether or not listed entities comply with disclosing those items on their reports. 
Moreover, this thesis chose to examine this topic in the country setting of Qatar as it is 
a vastly developing country devoted to become a lead player in international markets. 
Also, this thesis was highly motivated by the urge to study the improved corporate 
governance mechanisms realized in the country. Another motivation was to contribute 
to the extant literature on the topic at hand as it was merely touched in the context of 
Qatar in terms of corporate governance factors and mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures. 
Furthermore, this study was motivated by the lack of empirical evidence by the use of 
the partial compliance approach in the global arena.  
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In reference to the results of various extant studies on the topic at hand, laws 
conveyed in the country and theoretical grounds, nine hypotheses were generated, six 
relating to board size and three to ownership structures. The board characteristics 
examined included gender diversity, board size, CEO duality, founding family 
members on the board, proportion of non-executive directors, and cross (multiple) 
directorships. The ownership structure variables chosen in this thesis were institutional, 
government, and foreign ownership. In order to reach the objectives of this thesis, a 
sample size of 72 annual reports from 24 listed non-financial entities in Qatar for the 
years of 2015, 2016, and 2017 were chosen to be investigated. 
The level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements was 
operationalized by self-constructing a disclosure index consisting of 216 mandatory 
IAS/IFRS disclosure items from 12 different selected IAS/IFRS standards in the 
country setting of Qatar and the listed non-financial entities in the sample. In order to 
score this index and reach a score or ‘level’ of compliance, two scoring instruments 
were used. Firstly, the widely used dichotomous approach was used in this paper. The 
second instrument is the partial compliance approach. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, the latter was not studied in the context of Qatar. The scoring methods 
under both approaches gave unweighted scores to each item, (1) if it was disclosed, (0) 
if not, and (N/A) if it is not applicable to that certain entity. After careful scrutiny of 
the annual reports of each entity, each disclosure item was scored accordingly, leading 
to a final score under both methods for each entity. These scores were later combined 
with the scores of all other entities (72) for both methods. The compliance score under 
both methods illustrated a total compliance score under 86% under the DCS and 78% 
under the PCS. This answers the first objective set in this thesis which was to find the 
level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements in Qatar.  
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To further examine the influence of the independent variables on the compliance 
with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements (which was represented by two 
different scores), a multiple regression was conducted. The empirical evidence led to 
the rejection of most hypotheses except three: presence of females on the board, the 
proportion of non-executive directors and foreign ownership are negatively associated 
with the level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements under 
the dichotomous approach. However, presence of females on the board was also found 
to have a significant negative correlation with the level of compliance with mandatory 
IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements under the partial compliance approach. All other 
results of the regression portrayed mixed results for each scoring method.  
The variables of board size, cross directorships, institutional ownerships, and 
government ownerships were found to have no significant effect on the extent of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements in Qatari listed non-
financial entities under both scoring methods. Discrepancies in results appeared in the 
variables of CEO duality and presence of founding family members on the board which 
were both not significant under the dichotomous method but were positively correlated 
to the extent of compliance with IAS/IFRS disclosures under the partial compliance 
method. The proportion of non-executive directors was positively correlated with the 
extent of compliance with IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements under the partial 
compliance approach. Lastly, foreign ownership was found to have no significant 
association with the level of compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements under the partial compliance approach.    
The results of this thesis paper shed a light on the importance of carrying out 
compliance studies under the two measurement methods and more likely under the 
partial compliance method. This is because the partial compliance approach in 
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measuring compliance allocates similar weights to all chosen standards where it would 
generate conservative scores and is considered a more fair method for purposes 
pertaining to regulation (Abdullah & Minhat, 2013). Whereas under the dichotomous 
approach, they are quite misleading. In line with the argument set forth with 
Tsalavoutas (2011), results documented by previous studies are biased toward higher 
compliance as they solely relied on the dichotomous scoring method. The findings of 
this thesis depict the possible need to consider raising questions on the results 
documented by similar previous studies which investigated the matter by Cooke’s 
dichotomous approach. It also raises questions of interest whether the results 
documented in extant studies have reflected different outcomes should the authors have 
undertaken the partial compliance method.  Therefore, the second and third objectives 
from the onset of this paper: do board characteristics affect the level of compliance with 
mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures? Yes, but only gender diversity, CEO duality, 
presence of founding family members on the board, and non-executive directors. The 
third research objective was to find whether ownership structures affect the level of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures and as it was eminent in the results, 
only foreign ownership does.  
There are various limitations to this study. Initially, adequate information for 
the variables pertaining to ownership structures are not available in annual reports and 
are absent in most governance reports of several listed entities. Furthermore, the results 
of this paper are not generalizable to financial entities and entities excluded from the 
sample that are listed on the Qatar Stock Exchange or in neighboring countries since it 
focuses only on listed non-financial entities in Qatar. Also, both scoring methods used 
in this thesis required subjectivity, and this subjectivity as stated by Owusu-Ansah 
(1998), is unavoidable.  
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Regardless of its limitations, this study generated results which could have 
several implications. Regulators and enforcement bodies could benefit from this study 
by viewing how corporate governance mechanisms such as board and ownership 
structures could affect an entity’s compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements and implementing stricter regulations on these factors. Additionally, these 
parties alongside auditors could gain an insight on the overall degrees of compliance 
with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements in the country for the years of 2015, 
2016 and 2017. Moreover, boards, stakeholders and especially investors could benefit 
from the findings of this study as it sheds a light on how a possible characteristic 
eminent in an entity could impact the disclosures they see in annual or financial reports. 
In the same vein, the results documented in this thesis underline the positive impacts of 
separating the roles of the CEO and Chairman, having founding family members on the 
board and a high proportion of non-executive directors on supporting higher levels of 
compliance with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures. Therefore, another implication 
would be that parties concerned in forming boards would benefit from taking into 
consideration the positive impacts these board characteristics have on compliance with 
financial disclosures. Moreover, this thesis adds a new contribution to the literature by 
using the partial compliance approach in addition to Cooke’s approach. Hence, this 
study also holds benefits for future studies as they could use the findings portrayed 
under the two different scoring methods used to further underline the difference 
amongst methods.  
Future research could focus on various grounds such as investigating certain 
board characteristics and ownership structures on the levels of compliance with 
voluntary disclosures, environmental disclosures, and firm performance. Similar to this 
thesis, future studies could also include the fourth mechanism as a variable contributing 
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to a sound corporate governance structure: audit committees on the level of compliance 
with mandatory IAS/IFRS disclosures. Also, future research could study more recent 
years to capture the essence of growth in compliance in the country. Likewise, it is 
suggested that future studies increase the sample size in order to get more concrete 
results. Additionally, it is vital to note that each country is subject to its own norms, 
culture, and practices and would definitely have different economic factors than other 
countries. Therefore, future studies could also donate several different factors to the 
topic at hand such as cultural factors and the education levels of members of the board, 
chief financial officers or individuals on the audit committee. Moreover, future studies 
could include the possible effects of industrial classifications in their control variables. 
In the same vein, future research may utilize other research models or methods to better 
examine the causality between variables. In accordance to assumptions by Owusu-
Ansah (1998), linear relationships are expected to exist between the independent and 
the dependent variables of a regression model and usually act in that regard as 
impractical constraints on the model. Therefore, future research may embark on 
studying the associations between corporate governance factors and the degree of 
compliance with disclosures as non-linear. Since this thesis documented a difference 
among the extent of compliance under Cooke’s method and the partial compliance 
method, future research could also empirically investigate disclosure levels under both 
methods to portray in a comparative research how results differ. Finally, future research 
can conduct a comparative analysis on the new IFRSs prior to and after they were 
applied in the onset of 2018 to capture the essence of the changes in compliance with 
mandatory IFRS disclosures. 
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Appendix A: Excluded IASs/IFRSs with Exclusion Reasons 
Standard Title Reason for Exclusion 
IAS 10  Events after the Balance-Sheet Date 
Not applicable as there is no implication of this standard to the 
sample selected. 
IAS 11  Construction Contracts  This standard is only applicable to construction entities. 
IAS 12  Income Taxes Listed Entities are exempt from tax income. 
IAS 17  Leases 
This standard is only applicable to specific entities that apply the 
Operating lease and Finance lease-Not all 
IAS 19  Employee Benefits  
This standard only applied in one entity and remaining entities 
do not consider it due to materiality  
IAS 20 
Accounting for Government Grants 
and Disclosure of Government 
Assistance  
Not applicable as there is no implication of this standard to the 
sample selected.  
IAS 26  
Accounting and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefit Plans  
Not applicable as there is no implication of this standard to the 
sample selected. 
IAS 27  Separate Financial Statements  
Not applicable as the sample are all consolidated financial 
statements. 
IAS 28  
Investments in Associates and Joint 
Ventures 
This standard is only applicable to few entities. 
IAS 29  
Financial Reporting in 
Hyperinflationary Economies  
Not applicable as there is no implication of this standard to the 
sample selected. 
IAS 32  Financial Instruments: Presentation  The disclosure of this part is included in IAS 1. 
IAS 34  Interim Financial Reporting  
Not applicable as the focus is on the year-end financial 
statements. 
IAS 38 Intangible Assets 
This standard is only applicable to few entities; therefore; it is 
excluded. 
IAS 39 
Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement 
The disclosure of this part is included in IAS 1. 
IAS 40 Investment Property 
This standard is only applicable to few entities; therefore; it is 
excluded. 
IAS 41 Agriculture Not applicable since this industry is not in the sample selected. 
IAS 8  
Accounting Policies, Changes in 
Accounting Estimates and Errors 
Not applicable as there is no implication of this standard to the 
sample selected. 
IFRS 1  
First-time Adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards  
Not applicable since no entities and their subsidiaries are first 
time adopters that has impact on financial statement of the 
sample selected. 
IFRS 2 Share-Based Payment 
Not applicable as there is no implication of this standard to the 
sample  selected. 
IFRS 3  Business Combinations  
Not applicable as there is no implication of this standard to the 
sample  selected. 
IFRS 4  Insurance Contracts  Not applicable since this industry is not in the sample selected. 
IFRS 5  
Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and 
Discontinued Operations  
Not applicable as there is no implication of this standard to the 
sample  selected. 
IFRS 6  
Exploration for and Evaluation of 
Mineral Resources  
Not applicable since this industry is not in the sample selected. 
IFRS 7  Financial Instruments: Disclosures  Not applicable since this industry is not in the sample selected. 
IFRS 9  Financial Instruments  
Not applicable as this standard effective from 1 January 2018; 
early application is permitted. The listed entities did not use early 
application of this standard.  
IFRS 10  Consolidated Financial Statements  The disclosure of this part is included in IAS 1. 
IFRS 11  Joint Arrangements This standard is only applicable to a few entities. 
IFRS 12  
Disclosure of Interests in Other 
Entities  
This standard is only applicable to a few entities. 
IFRS 13  Fair Value Measurement  This standard is only applicable to a few entities. 
IFRS 14 Regulatory Deferral Accounts 
Not applicable as there is no implication of this standard to the 
sample selected. 
IFRS 15 
Revenue from Contracts with 
Customers 
Not applicable as this standard effective from 1 January 2018; 
early application is permitted. The listed entities did not use early 
application of this standard.  
IFRS 16 Leases  
Not applicable as this standard effective from 1 January 2019; 
early application is permitted. The listed entities did not use early 
application of this standard.  
IFRS 17 Insurance Contracts  Not applicable since this industry is not in the sample selected. 
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Appendix B: DCS Results for 2015  
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Appendix C: DCS Results for 2016  
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Appendix D: DCS Results for 2017 
 
 
 
  
144 
 
 
Appendix E: PCS Results for 2015 
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Appendix F: PCS Results for 2016  
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Appendix G: PCS Results for 2017 
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Appendix H: P-P Plots for DCS and PCS  
 
 
